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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
American courts have been significantly involved in 
determining the content and scope of Indian rights and the 
relationship these legal claims have with federal and state authority.1 
This jurisprudence exhibits the theoretical and practical complexity 
of allocating rights and authority among overlapping national, state, 
and tribal sovereignties. Moreover, unlike other common law settler 
states, American Indian law is premised on the notion of an 
efficacious tribal sovereignty. 2  This sovereignty pre-exists the 
American state but is subsumed within the American federation. Yet 
at the same time the law also exhibits a clear federal dominance; the 
national government has both the right and the power to override 
state and tribal authority and sovereignty in its exercise of its 
constitutional authority over Indians.  
This paper argues that the federal-state conflict that arose prior 
to the American Civil War has profoundly influenced much of the 
protective aspects of Native American jurisprudence, as found in the 
seminal Marshall Court opinions. As this law developed in light of 
state-federal conflict, the underlying policy and legal doctrines, 
while beneficial to Native American interests, ultimately had little 
to do with Indian self-determination or protective legal rules. This 
Antebellum Civil War period was characterized by intense 
philosophical and legal arguments concerning the nature of the 
American federation. The Marshall Court in particular became an 
important, if not primary, proponent of a national view of 
sovereignty, which it grounded in the international sovereignty of 
the national government and the 1789 constitutional text. Early 
American Indian jurisprudence, which was built upon principles of 
international law, pre-existing British imperial policy, and the 
various policies (peaceful, aggressive, assimilative) that the nascent 
United States used in dealing with the tribes, was an area in which 
this debate developed. The nationalist-minded Marshall Court 
essentially formulated an Indian Law which, emphasized federal 
authority and left little room for the states to exercise jurisdiction 
 
1 I will use the terms “Indian(s)”, “Native American(s)” and “indigenous” 
interchangeably in this paper. When discussing the national and state law 
concerning Indians, I will use the term Indian Law.  
2 Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: “High and Low Legal Cultures” in 
the Lands of the British Diaspora – The United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand 1600 – 1900 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
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over the tribes. At the same time, the Marshall Court used the 
international aspect of Indian law to depreciate the conception of 
state sovereignty advocated by the proponents of state rights. The 
concomitant federal dominance of the pre-confederation 
international tribes was a further justification for a national 
conception of sovereignty and federal authority.   
From a legal perspective these developments were not 
necessarily adverse to Native American interests. Their continued 
governmental existence, property rights, and law were guaranteed 
by the federal government and legally enforceable. Moreover, the 
legal efficacy of the Federal-Native American treaty process (which, 
despite the fraud, misrepresentation, and duress that often-
accompanied creation), set forth the mechanism by which the tribes 
as governmental entities were incorporated into the American 
federation. Further it established reserved rights for the tribes.  
However, because they developed in the context of state-federal 
conflict, the underlying legal discourse had little to do with Indian 
rights, interests, or continued existence either as a moral, ethical, or 
legal obligation. Rather the issue involved which jurisdiction had 
primary authority over Native Americans. Indeed, the history of 
American policy towards the tribes has been generally hostile 
towards them as governmental entities holding distinct political and 
legal rights.3  And the affirmation of federal dominance inherent 
within the Court’s tribal jurisprudence necessarily established the 
basis for the extension of federal authority under the plenary power 
doctrine (i.e. that the 1789 constitution grants the Federal 
government complete authority over Native Americans)4 and the 
conceptual basis for the political question doctrine5 which precluded 
judicial vindication and enforcement of Native American rights. 
 
3 William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, 
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. 
INDIAN. REV. 1 (2002). 
4 “The power of Congress over Indian Affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it 
is not absolute." United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 
(1946)(plurality opinion); The Plenary Power Doctrine is sourced in the 
Commerce Power, Treaty Power and is rooted in [(as suggested in dicta by 
Supreme Court in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 at 201 (2004)],  “the 
"preconstitutional powers" of the Federal Government. United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304 at 315-22 (1936). 
5 “The judicial power over cases and controversies has been limited when the 
question presented concerns "subject matter that the Court deems to be 
inappropriate for judicial review….the Court has observed that while there is 
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II. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY INTO THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
American Indian policy after the American War of 
Independence built upon British and colonial precedent. While often 
honored only in the breach, the policy presumed that Indian land 
cessions would be obtained by purchase and that inter-tribal 
relations were not subject to colonial jurisdiction without consent of 
the tribe. Prior to 1754, when the British appointed Imperial 
superintendents located in North America to manage political 
relations between the British and the Indians, the individual colonial 
governments had primary responsibility for Indian affairs. They 
negotiated their own treaties, developed policies and rules 
concerning land acquisition and jurisdiction, and extended colonial 
jurisdiction over particular tribes and Indians based on their 
relationship to the colonial government.6 The Proclamation of 1763 
sought to completely centralize colonial-Indian relations in the 
Imperial Crown. It established land purchasing procedures, required 
licenses and bonds for Indian traders, and sought to establish a 
boundary between settled areas and tribal lands. Nevertheless, the 
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing legal rules (from 
whatever source) continued to be the responsibility of local colonial 
officials such that in practice there remained considerable variation 
 
"no blanket rule" regarding a judicial consideration of  "whether Indians are 
recognized as a tribe" the question contains "familiar attributes of political 
questions." These categories of cases that have been identified share some 
characteristics that make them "beyond judicial cognizance." Michalyn  
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 
63 UCLA L. REV. 666 at 683-4 (2016). 
6 ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS, 
1620-1675  (Little, Brown and Co. 1965); Yasi Kawashima, Jurisdiction of the 
Colonial Courts over the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763, 42 THE NEW 
ENG. Q. 532 (1969); Vaughan and Kawashima describe three different 
relationships that the tribes and individual Indians had with the colonial 
government. The first category included those tribes who were completely 
independent of colonial jurisdiction and outside of the colonies boundaries. The 
second group involved tributary tribes or tribes within the colonial boundary 
over which the colony had nominal jurisdiction. The third category included 
those Indians who were jurisdictional treated no differently than other colonists. 
See also Mark D. Walters, Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the 
Legal Status of Aboriginal and Customary Laws and Government in British 
North America, 33 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 785 (1995). 
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among the colonies concerning the scope of Indian rights recognized 
by colonial governments. 7   
Following the American Revolution, the Articles of 
Confederation reflected a mixture of both the centralizing impulse 
found in late pre-revolution imperial policy as well as the earlier 
colony-specific approach.8 Overlaying the jurisdictional bifurcation 
was the early attitude of the successful revolutionaries that Indian 
tribes were “conquered” peoples who had no rights but those granted 
them by the newly independent states or national government. Early 
Confederation Congress committee reports emphasized that the 
“right of soil” and territorial sovereignty belonged to the United 
States and that tribes could “remain only on her sufferance.”9 The 
result was that the individual states and United States used high-
handed tactics to secure uncompensated land cessions. After some 
initial successes securing cessions in this way it became apparent 
that the approach was unworkable in practice. The state and national 
governments lacked the military power to enforce their claimed 
rights or secure ceded territory. The tribes resented the American 
claims to their territory and with British support waged successful 
military action against American forces and settlers. At the same 
time, there was considerable disagreement between national and 
state officials concerning the scope of state power over Indian 
affairs.10  
As the 1780s progressed there was a growing consensus that the 
unilateral approach towards the tribes was neither effective nor just. 
As Jones notes, the problems with the unilateral approach “forced” 
 
7 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 13-20 (Univ. of Neb. Press, 1970). 
8 Robert N. Clinton, “The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,” 27 CONN. L. 
REV. 1055 (1995) (Article IX reflects the disagreement concerning tension 
between national authority and the extent of state control over Indians gives 
Congress “the sole and exclusive rights and power of . . . regulating the trade 
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, 
provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not 
infringed or violated...”). 
9 Reginald Horsman, United States Indian Policies, 1776-1815, in HANDBOOK 
OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, VOLUME  4: HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE 
RELATIONS 29 (William C. Sturtevant, ed., Smithsonian Inst., 1988).  
10 Dorothy V. Jones notes that these initial American efforts approached Indian 
affairs as “a domestic problem.” As the efforts to maintain peace, secure 
American territory from other European powers and obtain land for settlement 
along the frontier failed American officials were “forced to consider relations 
with the Indians, rather than a unilateral policy for the Indians.” DOROTHY V. 
JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 147-
148 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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Americans officially “to consider relations with the Indians, rather 
than a unilateral policy for the Indians.” As part of this new 
approach, it was preferred by many policy makers that the federal 
government should be given primary authority over Indian tribes 
which was reflected in the 1789 constitution. In 1787, the Northwest 
Ordinance set forth a new approach to dealing with tribes and 
avoiding the excesses of American frontiersman and state policies. 
Article III of the Ordinance in part stated: 
 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards the Indians, their lands and property shall 
never be taken from them without their consent; and 
in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall 
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful 
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in 
justice and humanity shall from time to time be 
made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and 
for preserving peace and friendship with them.11 
 
The Washington Administration fully implemented a renewed 
commitment to treaty making, the recognition of the Native 
Americans’ peaceable right to the possession of their lands, and 
the purchase of land coupled with a uniform national strategy to 
coordinate Indian affairs. The policy, building on the approach 
outlined in Art. III of the Ordinance, sought to maintain peace, 
acquire land, and regulate trade in a way that recognized that the 
United States had “only limited sovereignty” over Indian 
Territory and that “the limitations [on federal/state authority] 
were set by the rights of the Indians inhabiting the land.” 12 It 
presumed that the preferred instruments that should be used in 
the Indian-American relationship were diplomatic intercourse 
and treaties. The United States would obtain Indian land by 
purchase. State and federal jurisdiction, if only in theory, over the 
tribes was not assumed. As the tribes were in fact politically 
 
11 The Northwest Ordinance, 1787; 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=8 
[https://perma.cc/V2YG-U87W]. 
12 JONES, supra, note 10, at 147 (At page 161 Jones points out that federal Indian 
policy was partly a product of local political struggles over land because each 
state laid down conditions for it to give up their claims to western Indian lands 
to the national government). 
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independent and could solicit support from Great Britain and 
Spain, the policy was not only expedient but was also a 
recognition that the possessory rights asserted by the tribes had a 
legal basis within the American legal system.13 The policy also 
provided for the “civilization” and assimilation of the tribes, an 
aspect that was increasingly emphasized in later 
administrations. 14  Signatory tribes were provided with 
agricultural implements, blacksmith equipment, and other sundry 
items to facilitate a sedentary agricultural lifestyle. Further, 
schools were established to introduce the signatory tribes to 
reading, writing, and Christianity. The Trade and Intercourse 
Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, and 1799 codified this approach for 
the next two decades.  
With expansion of American jurisdiction across the Mississippi 
watershed, federal policy underwent a dramatic shift. The Jackson 
Administration viewed the treaty making process and federal 
obligations that resulted from it as an “absurdity” and an 
“anachronism.”15 The Administration believed that it was “farcical 
to treat with the Indian tribes as though they were sovereign and 
independent nations…”16 The tribes, Jackson wrote, “have only a 
possessory right to the soil, for the purpose of hunting and not the 
right of domain….” 17  As such, they were subject to American 
national sovereignty and state jurisdiction by way of treaty, or if 
necessary, without their consent. Rather than treat with the tribes to 
 
13 Id. at 157-186. The recognition of aboriginal title is specifically spelled out in 
the Treaty of Greenville (1795) where the United States relinquished its 
jurisdictional and land title claims over previously ceded Indian land north of the 
Ohio River and south of the Great Lakes. Article 5 of the Treaty states: “To 
prevent any misunderstanding about the Indian lands relinquished by the United 
States in the fourth article, it is now explicitly declared, that the meaning of that 
relinquishment is this: the Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are 
quietly to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon, so long as they 
please, without any molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or 
any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to 
be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United States will 
protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all 
citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who intrude 
upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be 
under the protection of the said United States, and no other power whatever.” 
Article 7 of the treaty provided for the right to hunt on ceded lands mentioned in 
the treaty.  
14 PRUCHA, supra, note 7, at 213-224.  
15 Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era 10 (Univ. of 
Neb. Press 1975). 
16 PRUCHA, supra, note 7 at 233. 
17 Id. at 234. 
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mediate Native American-settler relations, the Administration 
believed that Indian and settler co-existence was fundamentally 
incompatible. It advocated the complete removal of the tribes in the 
east of the Mississippi River; a policy enacted by the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830.18  
The removal policy was not altogether new. It was premised on 
continued use of treaties to extinguish the tribes’ interest in territory 
to facilitate settlement of the frontier. “Civilization” and 
assimilation remained policy objectives. In order to placate critics, 
Jackson also proposed that removal would be voluntary and the 
tribes would be compensated for relinquishing their lands. 
Nevertheless, Jackson’s position that non-removed tribes would be 
subject to state law and his refusal to prevent the extension of state 
authority over territory guaranteed by treaty made emigration to the 
west hardly “voluntary.” The tribes that choose to remain would be 
subject to state and territorial law; a local law that state officials, 
federal officials, and Native Americans understood to be destructive 
of tribal political organization and lifestyle.19 By the end of the 
1840s many of the eastern tribes had removed west. 
However, due to tribal resistance and outcry from various 
humanitarian groups the removal policy was abandoned. The federal 
government returned to treaty making to extinguish title, establish 
reservation for the sole benefit of the contracting tribes, and provide 
for the subsequent provision of the tribes. Meanwhile, the 
reservations were extensively modified and diminished in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries by way of the General Allotment Act of 
1887. 20  The General Allotment Act of 1887 reversed previous 
policy that sought to remove tribal governments from settler society 
through the creation of reservations. Allotment was enacted in the 
hope that individual Native Americans would abandon their tribal 
 
18 Indian Removal Act, Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).  
19 See for example, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1830 
Section 5, “an Act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power, by all 
persons under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians and their laws, and 
to prevent white persons from residing within that part of the chartered limits of 
Georgia, occupied by the Cherokee Indians, and to provide a guard for the 
protection of the gold mines, and to enforce the laws of the State within the 
aforesaid territory,” 9dec. 22, 1830), Acts of the General Assembly of the State 
of Georgia, Annual Session in November and December 1830 (Milledgeville: 
Carmak & Ragland, 1831) at 114-117. 
20 Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
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identity and adopt “the habits of civilized life”. 21  Nevertheless, 
despite allotment and its objective of destroying tribal organisations 
and the Indian cultural distinctiveness, the underlying commitment 
to tribal sovereignty in law and policy continued to be the basis of 
federal policy.  
III. FEDERAL SUPREMACY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
 
A. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Antebellum United States 
 
During the development of Federal Indian Policy discussed 
above, the wider American polity was engaged in an existential 
struggle over the meaning of the federal union. The fundamental 
issue concerned whether the individual state governments or the 
federal government were the primary sovereign governmental entity 
in the American federation.  The controversy surrounding this issue 
of sovereignty revolved around those who advocated that the 
sovereign authority resided in Congress and the federal government 
(the Theory of National Supremacy) and those who located it in the 
states (the Compact Theory). Both theories accepted John Locke’s 
idea that individuals voluntarily unite together in political bodies to 
promote mutual safety and advantage, and that by doing so, they 
establish a governmental authority to which every citizen subjects 
themselves.22 Both theories assumed  that the people were the only 
true “sovereign” entity who in turn delegated their authority to the 
governmental entity. Thus: 
The government...of the state, is that portion, only 
of the sovereignty, which is by the constitution 
entrusted to the public functionaries: these are the 
agents and servants of the people.”23  
 
21 D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, UNIV. OF OKLA. 
PRESS at 7 (1973).  
22 “The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for 
preserving and advancing their civil goods....It is the duty of the civil magistrate, 
by impartially enacted equal laws, to preserve and secure for all the people in 
general, and for every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of 
these things that belong to this life.” John Locke, Letter on Toleration 65-67 
(John Gough ed., Clarendon Press 1968). 
23 Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries Vol. 1 app. 7., (St. 
George Tucker ed., 1969). 
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The difference between the two theories was whether the primary 
political society in the American federation was co-extensive with 
the state polities or was national in scope. This issue resolved itself 
into differing perspectives on the nature of the act or agreement that 
led to the ratification of the 1789 United States Constitution. 
The Theory of National Supremacy looked to the language of 
the Preamble of the 1789 Constitution.24 It was premised on the 
Lockean idea that the federal government was an act of the entire 
people of the United States who created civil and political society as 
a means to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of the state of 
nature. Therefore, it was not a creation of the state’s themselves.25 
The Marshall Court was a leading exponent of this view in its 
national jurisprudence. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the court stated 
the position forcefully. “The government,” the court declared, 
“proceeds directly from the people”: 
 
It is established in the name of the people...in order 
to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure 
domestic tranquility, and ensure the blessings of 
liberty to themselves and their prosperity.26  
 
The fact that the national government had enumerated powers 
related only to its capacity to do certain tasks, and it did not diminish 
its overall pre-eminence in the federal system. From this 
perspective, the states were not co-equal sovereigns independent of 
the federal government. Rather, they acted as complementary but 
 
24The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads: “We the People of 
the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, 
insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”  U.S. CONST. pmbl.   
25 “Whenever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society, as to quit 
everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, 
there, and there only, is a political, or civil society.  And this is done wherever 
any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into a society to make one 
people, one body politic, under one supreme government, or else when anyone 
joins himself to and incorporates with, any government already made.”  John 
Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government, in MAN AND THE STATE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS (107-108 
(Saxe Commines and Robert N. Linscott eds., 1947). For a discussion of the 
Lockean precepts to John Marshall’s jurisprudence see ROBERT KENNETH 
FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL (Princeton University 
Press, 1968). 
26 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-404 (1819) [hereafter McCulloch]. 
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necessarily inferior governments. As stated by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden: 
 
The genius and character of the whole government 
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the 
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal 
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to 
those which are completely within a particular State, 
which do not affect other States, and with which it is 
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing 
some of the general powers of government.27  
 
From this formulation, it followed that a state could not exclude 
federal authority, nor could it prevent the federal government from 
pursuing federal objectives within its territory. Like the state 
government, the federal government acted directly on the individual. 
It did not act through the instrumentalities of the state. As such, the 
federal government had both the authority and duty to promulgate, 
execute, and enforce its laws throughout the nation.28  
The Theory of National Supremacy not only held that the 
language of the 1789 Constitution established the preeminence of 
the federal government, but it also assumed that the federal 
government was the successor in interest to the British Crown. As 
such, it possessed international sovereignty, which was not held by 
the states.29 This authority was formally transferred by the treaty 
ending the Revolutionary War. As the court observed in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh: 
 
By the treaty which concluded the war of our 
revolution, Great Britain relinquished all claim, not 
only to the government, but also the "propriety and 
territorial rights of the United States....By this treaty, 
the powers of government, and the right to the soil, 
which had previously been in Great Britain, passed 
definitively to these States [sic].30  
 
 
27 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824). 
28 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
29 See FRANCES HOWELL RUDKO, JOHN MARSHALL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATESMAN AND CHIEF JUSTICE ( 1991). 
30 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584 (1823). 
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Nonetheless, in spite of the positive transfer of authority and 
proprietary rights by Great Britain in the Treaty in 1783, the court’s 
claim to federal international sovereignty from this perspective is 
was not the equal to that proposition that the 1789 Constitution 
conferred supremacy in international affairs to the national 
government at the time the Constitution was ratified. This second 
proposition suggests that the national government, as a creation of 
the “sovereign” states is entrusted by those states to engage in 
foreign relations on their behalf. Rather, the court posited that the 
individual states themselves never had international standing under 
positive or customary international law at any time.  As stated by 
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States: 
From the moment of the declaration of 
independence, if not for most purposes at an 
antecedent period, the united colonies must be 
considered as being a nation de facto, having a 
general government over it created, and acting by the 
general consent of the people of all the colonies.  The 
powers of that government were not, and indeed 
could not be well defined.  But its exclusive 
sovereignty, in many cases, was firmly established; 
and its controlling power over the states was in most, 
if not all national measures, universally admitted.31   
 
Thus, the international aspect of the federal government was 
accompanied by the accruements of international sovereignty. This 
international sovereignty was never held by the states and was 
always denied the states. Instead the federal government’s 
international sovereignty arose from the initial collective steps of the 
individual colonies to resist British sovereignty. And it was not 
related in any way to state sovereignty or the institutional 
arrangements by which the states transferred authority to the 
national government in the 1781 Articles of Confederation or the 
1789 Constitution. 
 
31 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES VOL. 1 203 (1970); Marshall wrote Story regarding his Commentaries 
stating, “It is a subject [the constitution] on which we concur exactly. Our 
opinions on it are, I believe, identical.” ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF 
JOHN MARSHALL VOL. 4 569-70 (1919). 
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The court supported its position that the national government 
had international sovereignty to which the states could never be 
competent by observing that other international states had only 
recognized the national government (either the Continental 
Congress or the Confederation Congress) prior to the 1789 
Constitution; that the 1789 Treaty Power32 presumed international 
recognition by other sovereign states; that only the federal 
government had the right to wage both offensive and defensive war, 
and opining that no authority was superior to the federal government 
when it was exercising its enumerated powers. 
Proponents of the Compact Theory were vehement opponents of 
this view. Supporters of the Compact Theory generally subscribed 
to the idea that the federal government resulted from a compact 
between the states “as states” and was not the creation of the 
American people in their sovereign capacity. The supporters of this 
theory (the Compact Theory) argued that all the national 
governments of the United States (the Continental Congresses, the 
Confederation Congress, and the 1789 Federal Government) were 
the creation of independent and sovereign states, and that the 
national government exercised no authority over the states or the 
people that the states did not themselves possess prior to its creation. 
They claimed that the 1789 Constitution, despite the language of the 
preamble, the various powers granted the federal government, and 
limitations of state jurisdiction, in no way diminished the underlying 
sovereignty and authority of each state. The federal government had 
neither domestic nor international pre-eminence but had a residual 
sovereignty and a paramount interest in international affairs. From 
this perspective the United States was simply a confederated 
republic similar to the Swiss confederation described by Swiss 
international law theorist Emmerich Vattel: 
 
In short, several sovereign and independent states 
may unite themselves together by perpetual 
 
32 Art. VI, sec. 3 of the U.S. Constitution reads “This Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” A treaty “is in its nature a contract between two nations.” 
Where it is negotiated and ratified with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate it 
is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of the legislature.” 
Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
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confederacy, without each ceasing to be a perfect 
state. They will form together a federal republic: 
deliberations in common will offer no violence to the 
sovereignty of each member, though they may, in 
certain respects put some constraints on the exercise 
of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person 
does not cease to be free and independent, when he 
is obliged to fulfil the engagements into which he 
willingly entered.33  
 
The Compact Theory squarely posited that the states, as states, were 
the original Lockean civil society. From the moment of the 1776 
Declaration of Independence, each individual colony became a de 
facto and de jure independent sovereign state in the domestic and 
international spheres.  They had behaved as such at the Continental 
Congresses. 34  These independent states then entered into the 
Articles of Confederation and the 1789 Constitution in order to 
manage certain affairs common to them all. The powers of the 1789 
national government were specifically enumerated powers, which 
partook a sovereign quality in the area of international relations, but 
in no way did the 1789 national government’s exercise of their 
powers diminish the sovereignty of the individual states.  As such, 
the individual states and the federal government were co-equal 
sovereigns under the 1789 Constitution.35 As co-equal sovereigns, 
each state could judge the content of federal statutes and judge the 
constitutionality of particular federal acts, notwithstanding the 
national judiciary or other national political branches.  
 
33 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 18 (Luke White, 
trans., 1792). Vattel’s 1758 Treatise was the most important works on the law of 
nations in the eighteenth century. Vattel was cited as a major source of 
contemporary wisdom on questions of international law in the American 
Revolution and in the early period of the republic. 
34 Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical 
Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907). 
35 See Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith, August 2, 1823 in which the former 
president referred to the national and state governments as “two coordinate 
governments, each sovereign and independent in its department....The one may 
be strictly called the Domestic branch of government which is sectional but 
sovereign, the other the foreign branch of government equally sovereign on its 
own side of the line....” JEAN SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 
664 (1996). 
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In the decades following President Washington’s tenure, the 
Compact Theory gained more adherents.36 As partisan fervor rose 
between the Federalist Party and the nascent Democratic-
Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson, the Democrats emphasized 
the idea of state assent to the Union and the principle of 
undiminished state sovereignty to argue for a more limited notion of 
federal authority.37  Less than a decade after ratification of the 1789 
Constitution, Jefferson declared that the powers of the federal 
government were the result of a “compact to which the states are 
parties.” This compact was one where “each state acceded [to it] as 
a state” and one in which each state “is an integral party.”38  Later, 
in McCulloch, the counsel for Maryland explicitly put forth this 
argument against national authority.39 The position was advanced 
by Georgia in the Cherokee cases (1829-1834) and the state of South 
Carolina in the 1832 tariff dispute. In these disputes, both states 
argued, consistent with Compact Theory, that the national 
government had no authority to enforce federal legislation. Further, 
Georgia and South Carolina insisted that each individual state 
retained an absolute right to judge for itself the constitutionality of 
various federal laws.40  
 
B. Conceptions of Sovereignty and State and Indian Land Rights in 
Antebellum America 
 
1. Sovereignty and International Law  
 
During the Marshall Court era (1804-1835), international law 
theorists posited that the sovereignty of a state consisted of two 
 
36 During the debate regarding the ratification of the 1789 Constitution, the 
constitutional convention had recognized that legislative ratification of the 
Articles of Confederation undermined the authority of the national government. 
For example, James Madison stated in 1788 that “among the defects of the 
confederation, that in Many of the States, it had received no higher sanction than 
a mere legislative ratification.” ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & 
JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 224 (Bantam Books 1982). 
37 Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 719-726 (1993). 
38 Joseph Story, supra, note 31 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States 329 (Da Capo Press 1970). 
39 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 363-369 (1819). 
40 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall Vol. 4 555-573 (1919). 
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parts: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. 41   Internal 
sovereignty is the “right of control” which is inherent in the people 
of any state, or vested in its ruler, by the constitution or by municipal 
law.42  As the Vattel noted: 
 
Every Nation which governs itself, under whatever 
form [democracy, aristocratic, monarchy], and 
which does not depend on any other Nation, is a 
sovereign State.  Its rights are, in the natural order, 
the same as those of every other State.  Such is the 
character of the moral persons who live together in a 
society established by nature and subject to the Law 
of Nations.  To give a nation the right to a definite 
position in this great society, it need only to be truly 
sovereign and independent; it must govern itself by 
its own authority and its own laws. [emphasis in 
original]43  
 
The sovereign state had both the right and duty to preserve its 
existence and expect the obedience of individuals who lived within 
its border to abide by its rules. 
 
When men, by the act of associating together, form a 
State or Nation, each individual agrees to procure the 
common good of all, and together agree to assist each 
in obtaining the means of providing for his needs and 
to protect and defend him.44  
 
This control over individuals and the competence to make law or 
legislate and bind the political society differentiated the sovereign 
state from a non-sovereign state. “Sovereignty” as international 
 
41 I owe this topology to Henry Wheaton.  Wheaton was the Court Reporter for 
the Marshall Court from 1816 and 1827. He oversaw twelve volumes of the U.S. 
Reports. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (William 
Beach Lawrence ed., 6th ed.1855). 
42 Id. at 29-30. 
43 Emmerich De Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, 
appliques a la Conduite et aux Affairs des Nations et des Souverains, in THE 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (George D. Gregory trans., James Brown 
Scott ed.,1964). 
44 Id. at 13. 
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theorist Pufendorf stated, “is properly used only as over men....”45  
The ability to bind members of the society must be paramount 
within that society. 
Regarding internal sovereignty, American legal theory posited 
that actual sovereignty rested with the American people. 46  
Government has a derivative sovereignty which was the result of the 
erection of some governmental authority. 47  The Marshall Court 
accepted this proposition as axiomatic of the American experiment. 
As the court stated in Marbury v. Madison: 
 
That the people have an original right to establish for 
their future government, such principles, as in their 
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness 
is the very basis on which the whole American fabric 
has been erected.48   
 
The sovereignty of the people, upon the creation of the state and 
national governments, was the assertion of the absolute right of 
control within the territory of the United States. As Chief Justice 
Marshall noted: 
 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory 
is necessarily exclusive and absolute.  It is 
 
45 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo,” in THE CLASSICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., James 
Brown Scott ed., 1964). 
46 “It has been thought a considerable advance towards establishing the 
principles of Freedom to say that Government is a compact between those who 
govern and those who are governed; but this cannot be true, because itis putting 
the effect before the cause; for as man must have existed before governments 
existed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exist, and 
consequently there could originally exist no governors to form such a compact 
with. The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own 
personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce 
a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to 
arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist. THOMAS 
PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1974) 35 (Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner ed., 
1937).  
47 “Power in the People is like in the sun, native, original, inherent, and 
unlimited, by anything human. In government it may be compared to the 
reflected light of the moon; for it is only borrowed, delegated and limited by the 
intention of the people, whose it is, and whom governors are to consider 
themselves responsible....” William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries 
Vol 1. app. 9 (St. George Tucker ed., 1969) (quoting Burgh, Political 
Disquisitions, vol. 1, c. 2). 
48 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
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susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. 
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
external source, would imply a diminution of its 
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction....49  
 
In McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the court ruled that the internal 
sovereignty of the United States was complete from the time the 
states declared themselves independent.50   
Contrary to internal sovereignty which is premised on the 
exercise of exclusive authority within a territory, external 
sovereignty is the sovereignty conferred upon a sovereign state by it 
engaging in intercourse with other sovereign states.  A state which 
possesses internal sovereignty and control does not need to seek 
external sovereignty as it is completely independent. However, if a 
state wishes to engage in the obligations and rights of states, to 
benefit from that society of nations, then it must be recognized as 
being sovereign in an external sense.  International sovereign states 
are juridically equal regardless of their actual internal and external 
power.  
The society or community of international states or nations is 
where the international relations of a state are maintained. There are 
no rights bestowed on individuals. Rather, the rights and duties are 
owed to other members of the society of nations.  The issues, for the 
most part, are those of war, peace, and commerce.  External 
sovereignty is evidenced by the use of treaties for peace, alliances, 
or commerce in external relations and the use of force on external 
neighbors in defense of the sovereign state.  
The Marshall Court subscribed to the view that external 
sovereignty was a function of recognition by other states. This 
concern was partially the result of the fact that some states, such as 
the revolutionary United States, in their efforts to become 
independent, had no practical means of entering the society of 
nations without recognition. Prior to recognition and entry into the 
society of sovereign states, international law conferred no rights 
upon a rebellious state, a colony, or an internally sovereign state. 
International law had no concern for the rebellious or revolutionary 
state, other than the developing law of neutrality, and the law did 
not consider the revolutionary state worthy of recognition.  Rather, 
 
49 Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). 
50 McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 29 U.S. 209, 211 (1808). 
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in these types of internal conflict, the rights and duties of the 
sovereign asserting a right of dominion were to be considered as 
dispositive by other sovereign states. The Court in Rose v. Himely, 
which involved the seizure of a ship by the rebellious colony of St. 
Domingo, recognized the importance of the assertions of claims of 
sovereignty by a state recognized under the law of nations: 
 
It has been argued, that the colony, having declared 
itself a sovereign state, and having thus far 
maintained its sovereignty by arms, must be 
considered and treated by other nations, as a 
sovereign in fact, and as being entitled to maintain 
the same intercourse with the world that is 
maintained by other belligerent nations.  In support 
of this argument, the doctrines of Vattel have been 
particularly referred to.  But the language of that 
writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to 
courts.  It is for governments to decide, whether they 
will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation, 
and until such decision shall be made, or France shall 
relinquish her claim, courts of justice must consider 
the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered, 
and the sovereign power of France over that colony 
as still subsisting.51   
 
Thus, recognition was in many ways tantamount to actual 
independence and sovereignty regardless of a particular 
revolutionary government’s dominion and authority over its 
territory or the efforts by an established sovereign to prevent 
statehood. As such, the failure of the international community to 
recognize the individual states (as opposed to the national 
government which was recognized) during the revolutionary was 
evidence of their diminished sovereignty within the American 
federation. 
 
2. Doctrine of Discovery 
 
The issue of who would control the alienation of Indian lands in 
the post-revolutionary period and who had jurisdiction over the 
 
51 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 271 (1808). 
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tribes brought into sharp focus the divergent theoretical 
underpinnings of the American federation discussed above.  The 
three contending legal doctrines on the legal status and rights of 
Indian tribes were the Doctrine of Discovery, the Doctrine of the 
Landed States, and the Doctrine of Natural Rights.  Each had a 
different conception of Indian rights, which, in turn, supported a 
different interest in the debate concerning who would control the 
sale and settlement of frontier lands.  Ultimately, the issue involved 
which level of government could claim pre-eminent status as a 
receptacle of the sovereign will of the American people. The 
Marshall Court was the fulcrum of the debate and systematically 
undermined the legal positions that would challenge federal 
supremacy. 
The Doctrine of Discovery, as articulated by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh, holds that Indians maintained 
occupancy rights subject to the right of extinguishment by the 
federal government. Any other extinguishment of Indian title or 
alienation of Indian land title by either Indians or the states was void 
under this Doctrine.52    
The Doctrine of Discovery was perhaps most forcefully asserted 
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation stated that the 
Indians had a continued right to occupancy in their lands subject to 
the Crown’s right of first purchase.53 The rights of Indians to lands 
not ceded or purchased by the Crown were reserved for the 
occupying Indians. Private citizens were strictly enjoined from 
making purchases and settlements from the Indians without license 
from the Crown.  The federal government asserted this claim as 
successor in interest to the Crown, as well as under the 1789 federal 
Constitution, which granted the federal government the authority to 
regulate commerce “with the Indian Tribes”, and its treaties were 
declared to be supreme law. 
 
52 The doctrine was extensively debated, by both proponents and critics.  Its 
critics in international law were many. Grotius, for example did not recognize 
discovery as establishing full title.  Pufendorf noted “The bare seeing a thing or 
the knowing where it is, is not judged sufficient title of Possession.” M.F. 
LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT IN BACKWARD TERRITORY 131 
(1926) (quoting Pufendorf). 
53 For an in-depth discussion of the Proclamation see Robert N. Clinton, The 
Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-States 
Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 329 
(1989). 
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The Doctrine of Discovery was grounded in positive 
international law. 54  Positive international law assumed that 
dominion or sovereignty of newly discovered territory need not 
depend upon ownership of property, but rather, was grounded on the 
consent of other state actors to the "principal of exclusivity" 
regarding the newly discovered territory. The states whose 
"sovereign" consent was considered necessary were those European 
states engaged in discovery and conquest. The principle of 
exclusivity overlay a more fundamental premise of the international 
system; that all title ultimately rests upon the sword or the pre-
emptive power of the state to purchase land. Hugo Grotius, the 
international legal theorist, stated that: 
 
[A]ccording to the law of nations, not only the 
person, who makes war upon just grounds; but any 
one whatever, engaged in regular and formal war, 
becomes absolute proprietor of everything which he 
takes from the enemy: so that all nations respect his 
title, and the title of all, who derive through him their 
claim to such possessions.55   
 
The Doctrine of Discovery had little room for either the "non-
civilized" states or for the indigenous inhabitants of territory 
claimed by European states. 56  The exclusivity claimed by one 
international actor necessarily derogated the sovereign rights of the 
indigenous peoples regardless of the actual state of affairs on the 
ground. European legal theorists simply side-stepped the issue of 
"actual" tribal control of the land by denying that indigenous states 
had sovereignty in the international sphere.  It then followed that the 
claims and rights of any indigenous inhabitants were subordinate to 
those of the first European discoverer and that discoverer's 
successors. The legal relations governing the discoverer and the 
indigenous people were determined by the internal law of the 
 
54 F. Von Der Heydte, “Discovery and Annexation in International Law” 29 AM. 
J. OF INT’L L. 448 (1935). 
55 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 335 (A.C. Campbell trans., 
M. Walter Dunne, ed., 1901). 
56 For example, Pope Alexander's Papal Bull of 1493 whereby he sought to 
divide the new world between Spain and Portugal. The Pope reserved from his 
grant to Spain all lands which had been occupied by any other "Christian" 
nation. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, in THE CLASSICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-202 (James F. Scott ed., 1936). 
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discoverer. This law could either protect the ownership rights of the 
tribes and individual Indians or be destructive of their interests. In 
any event, the Doctrine of Discovery provided no legal basis for the 
tribes to assert any rights under international law or within the 
domestic law of the European discoverer. 
 
3. Doctrine of the Landed States 
 
The "landed" states were those states which had colonial 
charters that granted them land beyond the Appalachian 
Mountains. 57  The charters, in one form or another, had granted 
the colonies who held them all title and ownership of land held by 
the Crown within the prescribed limits of the charter, whether or 
not the land was occupied by Indians. The states asserted a right to 
control and alienate Indian lands based on their Crown charters and 
their sovereignty as states gained in the revolutionary struggle.    
It has been argued that these claims to the frontier land were 
essentially a legal formulation by elites in each landed state to secure 
western lands from the central government after the revolution freed 
the colonies from British control.58 Be this as it may, the landed 
states did not derive their claim over Indian lands from positive 
international law or prerogatives of the British Crown. Rather, the 
doctrine was based upon a Lockean conception of society and 
property. Locke argued that things in nature which were removed 
from their natural state by human labor became an individual's 
property.59 For those who settled the frontier, Locke stated that "he 
who appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but 
increases the common stock of mankind. [emphasis in original]"60  
Concomitant with the appropriation of property from nature for the 
private good, free individuals have the right to consent to 
 
57 The "landed" states included Virginia, New York, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia.  The 
landless states included Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Delaware, New 
Jersey. 
58 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 162-196 
(1969). 
59 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government in MAN AND THE STATE: THE 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 327-329 (Saxe Commines & Robert N. Linscott eds., 
1963). 
60 Id. at 336. 
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government to order their relations.  The consent of individuals to 
the creation of government is the basis of sovereignty. 61  
The resultant formula held that individuals and their sovereign 
states had both the right and duty to possess and develop the wild 
and vacant lands held by the Indians.  Thomas Jefferson stated this 
thesis in "A Summary View of the Rights of British America" in 
1774: 
 
The fictitious principle that all lands belong 
originally to the king, they [the colonists] were early 
persuaded to believe real, and accordingly took 
grants of their own from the crown....It is time 
therefore for us to lay this matter before his majesty, 
and to declare that he has no right to grant lands of 
himself. From the nature and purpose of civil 
institutions, all the lands within the limits which any 
particular society has circumscribed around itself, 
are assumed by that society, and subject to their 
allotment; this may be done by themselves, 
assembled collectively, or by their legislature, to 
whom they may have delegated sovereign authority. 
And if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each 
individual of the society may appropriate to himself 
such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will 
give him title.62  
 
Additionally, the fact that Indians generally used territory for 
hunting rather than agriculture gave additional impetus to the idea 
that the Americans could appropriate land under Lockean 
justifications.63  
 
61 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 103-106 (1974). 
62  Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 18-19 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1985). 
63 For example, John Quincy Adams in 1802 discussed the scope of the Indians’ 
possessory rights. “The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to 
the greatest part of the country upon a questionable foundation.  Their cultivated 
fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample sufficiency for their 
subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to themselves by personal labor, 
was undoubtably by the laws of nature theirs.  But what is the right of a 
huntsman [?][sic]...Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and 
enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a 
world?  Shall he forbid the wilderness to blossom like a rose? Shall he forbid the 
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While the Doctrine of Discovery essentially posited that the 
sovereign claim was an "exclusionist act" to keep other sovereigns 
out, the Doctrine of Landed States claimed that state sovereignty 
over the Indian frontier arose from the cultivation and habitation of 
land by citizens of the state government who is asserting 
sovereignty. In this sense, Indian title and jurisdiction over Indians 
was also a matter controlled by municipal law. Civil society did not 
protect the interests of aboriginals who engaged in occupations such 
as hunting. However, where the Doctrine of Discovery was 
essentially unconcerned about the rights of indigenous inhabitants, 
the Doctrine of the Landed States denied at the level of theory that 
Indians held anything more than temporary occupancy rights or that 
they were sovereign in any respect due to their non-agricultural 
existence and incompetence to form a civil society.   
 
4. Doctrine of Natural Rights of Indians 
 
The natural rights of the Indians to own and possess their 
territory in a manner that would be upheld by American courts were 
supported by those who wished to protect individual purchases from 
them.  If tribes could convey full title in fee, huge land purchases 
from them would benefit land speculators who were moving west 
ahead of state and federal authority.  This perspective necessitated a 
legal position that held that tribes were independent entities on the 
international plane and that individual Indians had the same natural 
rights, particularly with respect to property, as Europeans.   
The Doctrine of Natural Rights of Indians had two primary 
sources. First, the doctrine extended the logic of Locke and his 
Republican proponents in America to individual Indians and Indian 
tribes.  Samuel Wharton, a long-time speculator and member of the 
Continental Congress, set forth this view in the 1781 pamphlet 
“Plain Facts: Being an Examination into the Rights of the Indian 
Nations of America to their Respective Countries,” which he 
published to persuade the delegates to affirm land company claims 
 
oaks of the forest to fall before the axe of industry and rise again transformed 
into habitations of ease and elegance?" Howard R. Beram, The Concept of 
Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. 
REV. 637, 639-640 (1978) (quoting John Quincy Adams). 
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in Virginia’s proposed northwest cession.64 Wharton declared that 
Indians followed the "first immutable law of nature” in exercising 
their God-Given rights of self-preservation—rights that necessarily 
included the right to acquire, hold, and alienate property. 65 Because 
the Indians had natural rights, Europeans could not deprive them of 
the use and enjoyment of their dominions. Unless the particular tribe 
was conquered, the law of these societies remained in effect. Non-
conquered Indians could sell their land to whomever they pleased,, 
and the federal and state governments were bound to recognize the 
conveyance.66   
Second, the Doctrine of Natural Rights outright rejected the 
idea that the discovery of new lands extinguished the proprietary 
rights of the Indians as a matter of international law. This point of 
view was exposited by Victoria, a Dominican priest and legal 
theorist. Victoria stated that Indians “were true owners, both from 
the public and private standpoint” and that the “discovery of them 
by the Spaniards had no more effect on their property than the 
discovery of the Spaniards by the Indians had on Spanish property.” 
67   
 
C. Federal and State Sovereignty and the Early Indian Cases 
 
These various conceptions of state, federal and Indian 
sovereignty and rights, promoted by different contending interests 
in early American society, clashed in the seminal Marshall Court 
Indian law cases. The impact of these foundational opinions, 
Fletcher v. Peck, Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
and Worcester v. Georgia, has been much disputed. Robert A. 
 
64 Samuel Warton, Plain facts: Being an Examination into the Rights of the 
Indian Nations of America, to their respective Countries; And a Vindication of 
the Grant from the Six United Nations of Indians, to The Proprietors of Indiana, 
Against the Decision of the Legislature of Virginia Together With Authentic 
Documents Proving That the Territory, Westward of the Allegany Mountain, 
never belonged to Virginia (1781), 
https://archive.org/details/plainfactsbeinge00whar; See also James D. Anderson, 
Samuel Wharton and the Indians' Rights to Sell Their Land: An Eighteenth-
Century View, 63, The W. Pa. Hist. Mag. 121 (1980);  Robert A. Williams Jr., 
Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal 
History of Racism in America 298-300 (2005). 
65 Id. at 4-5. 
66 Id.at 26-28, 112. 
67 Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 45 (1947). See also 
Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United 
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942).  
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Williams argues that these early opinions of Chief Justice John 
Marshall were representative of, or “reinforced”,”, racial stereotypes 
that justified the savagery and injustices inflicted upon the tribes by 
the colonial project and the ascendancy of white American 
civilization.68  Lindsay Robertson has argued that the Johnson v. 
M’Intosh opinion was crafted by Justice Marshall to address several 
contemporary political problems between Virginia and Kentucky 
concerning land grants to revolutionary war veterans. He argues that 
Marshall’s opinion went beyond the legal issues in the M’Intosh 
case (which according to Robertson concerned the effect of the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 on pre-revolutionary war Indian land 
purchases), so that Marshall could ground sovereign title under the 
Discovery doctrine and establish a precedent to extend state 
jurisdiction over the tribes in a manner which ignored both inherent 
tribal rights to autonomy and federal constitutional prerogatives.69    
Yet these cases, despite the use of racist language, images of 
Indian savagery and Marshall’s immediate political objectives, 
fundamentally espouse a notion of federal supremacy over the 
states and tribes. Placed in the context of the federal-state dispute 
and the various justifications for the legal efficacy of Indian rights, 
 
68 Robert A. Williams Jr., Like A Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian 
Rights, And The Legal History Of Racism In America (2005). 
69 LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 77-94 (New 
York: Oxford University Press (2005)); See e.g. Caldwell v. State, 1 Ala. 327 at 
327, 470-72 (1832), where Taylor, J. of the Supreme Court of Alabama writes 
“After a patient and laborious investigation, I can find nothing, either in ancient 
charters; the conduct of any European power, or the opinion of any respectable 
writer of older date than 1825, which tends in the remotest degree to 
countenance the opinion that the Indian tribes have ever been considered as 
distinct and independent communities. In the language of Chief Justice 
Marshall, in the case of Johnson vs. McIntosh, “discovery gave an exclusive 
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or conquest; 
and gave them” (the discoverers) “also, a right to such a degree of sovereignty 
as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.” “The 
circumstances of the people” did not “allow them to exercise” jurisdiction over 
many of the tribes within the limits of the colonies at an early day." Those tribes 
lived beyond their reach or control, and wandered over immense forests which 
the people of the colonies never had penetrated, and within and beyond which, 
they had no intercourse. But so fast as these forests disappeared before their 
extending settlements, and those once distant tribes were brought within reach of 
the laws, and in contact with the settlements of their civilized and more powerful 
neighbors; so far, in fine, “as the circumstances of the people would allow them 
to exercise” jurisdiction and sovereignty over their persons and their country; 
thus fast they were brought under the influence of those laws, and compelled to 
yield to that jurisdiction and sovereignty.” 
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the Court’s notion of national supremacy necessarily enhanced 
tribal sovereignty when it grounded national and international 
sovereignty in the federal government. The Court accepted the idea 
of legally enforceable Indian property rights and recognized that 
tribes were self-governing entities within the American legal 
system. Moreover, as part of the effort to demonstrate that the 
national government was supreme within the American federation, 
the Court compared and contrasted tribes with the states – 
emphasizing the historical reality of the sovereign and independent 
tribes to the dependent colonial non-sovereign status of the states. 
Yet the Court’s conception of national power, with its 
demonstration that federal authority both trumped and subsumed the 
pre-existing sovereign tribes, also established that Indian rights were 
ultimately subject to federal power; and their rights and possessions 
could be disregarded without their consent or legal intervention by 
the courts. This “legal discourse of empire” over the Indians fully 
surfaced only after the triumph of the nationalist conception of 
sovereignty in the American Civil War with the abandonment of the 
treaty-making in 1871 by Congress and articulation of the plenary 
power doctrine in United States v. Kagama and Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock.70 In this sense, American Indian law is imbricated with 
the sovereign and institutional prerogatives of the national state and 
the socio-economic dominance of the American settlers. 
Nevertheless, the contest over which level of government is supreme 
within the federal structure carved out a set of legal principles and 
legal doctrines that are modestly solicitous of Indian rights. Despite 
legislative policies directed towards assimilation and the judicial re-
interpretations that have significantly narrowed the scope of tribal 
sovereignty, these principles continue to inform Indian 
jurisprudence.  
 
1. Fletcher v. Peck 
 
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Marshall Court held that a Georgia 
statute, which annulled a previous conveyance of public lands 
authorized by a prior enactment, as violative of the obligation of 
contracts clause (Art. I, § 10) of the Constitution.71 While essentially 
 
70 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 
U.S. 553 (1903). 
71 The Contracts Clause is found at U.S. Const. art. I, §X 
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a contracts clause case, Fletcher v. Peck remains the first major case 
regarding the nature of tribal rights and Indian title. The case 
involved a grant of land by the State of Georgia to an individual. 
Only Indians occupied the land.  After several years, the original 
grant was rescinded by the Georgia legislature because of alleged 
undue influence by various interested individuals at the time of the 
original grant. 
Considering the question of Georgia’s right to convey the land, 
the Court directly confronted the issue of whether the state had title 
to it. The plaintiff argued that Georgia was never seized of the land 
at the time of conveyance, so there was no valid conveyance.  
Instead, it was the property of either the United States or the Indians.  
He argued that the reservation of land for the Indians in the 
Proclamation of 1763 “excepts the lands on the western waters from 
the colonies within whose bounds they would otherwise have 
been....” As these lands were not part of Georgia at the 
commencement of the War of Independence, but were acquired in 
the war, the actual title lay with the United States, not Georgia.  Such 
conquests, the plaintiff argued, were "made by joint arms, for the 
joint benefit of the United States, and not for the benefit of any 
particular state." 72   As Georgia did not own the land, the 
conveyance was void. 
The Court rejected this argument. “The question of whether the 
vacant lands within the United States became joint property or 
belonged to the separate states… at one time threatened to shake the 
American confederacy to its foundation.” It would not disturb the 
compromise. 73  Instead, title to all lands conquered or occupied 
during the War of Independence went to “the people of the several 
states.” 
[A]ll the right and Royal prerogatives devolved upon 
the people of the several states, to be exercised in 
such manner as they should prescribe, and by such 
governments as they should erect.  The right of 
disposing of the lands belonging to a state naturally 
devolved upon the legislative body; who were to 
enact such laws as should authorize the sale and 
conveyance of them.74   
 
72 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 at 125, 142 (1810). 
73 Id. at 142. 
74 Id. at 121. 
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With the rejection of the idea that the western lands were held in 
fee simple by the United States, the Court needed to consider the 
nature of the conveyance.  The dilemma facing the Court on this 
issue was acute.  In 1802, Georgia had conveyed all the interest it 
had in the frontier lands to the federal government when the 1796 
Non-Intercourse Act was renewed. 75  In this session, the parties 
agreed that Indian lands would be preserved from seizure or entry 
without their consent and that Indian rights would be defended 
against white settlers by the federal government.76 However, prior 
to this 1802 cession, the Georgia legislature had “vested absolutely” 
those lands in a private individual.  The Fletcher Court noted,,"[T]he 
grant, when issued, conveyed an estate in fee simple to the 
grantee,...This estate is transferable." 77   Yet this perfect title at 
common law could lead to an ejectment action against the Indian 
occupiers.78 The conveyance and the theoretical possibility of an 
ejectment action directly challenged national supremacy in Indian 
affairs.79  
The Court accepted the argument that Georgia had the right to 
dispose of lands within its territory. However, the Court did not 
embrace the argument that sovereignty and title of the frontier lands 
had passed from Great Britain directly to the States at the time of 
the revolution.80  Rather, the Court reaffirmed federal authority and 
hinted at the underlying sovereign pre-eminence of the national 
government.  The Court lessened Georgia’s governmental authority 
by disaggregating the legal construct that merged all sovereign 
authority and title in the Crown.  This concept, if adopted in 
Fletcher, would have buttressed the claim that the states were the 
pre-eminent receptacles of sovereign authority in the American 
federal system. Also, the Court upheld Indian title as an 
encumbrance on the land which the state could not extinguish 
without federal assistance. Thus, the Indian title actually upheld 
federal pre-eminence. As such, the Court, consistent with 
 
75 PRUCHA, at 43-50 (1962). 
76 4 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 539 (1919).  
77 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 134. 
78 “It was doubted whether a state can be seized in fee of lands, subject to the 
Indian title, and whether a decision that they were seized in fee, might not be 
construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an ejectment 
for them, notwithstanding that title.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142. 
79 WILLIAMS, supra note 68, 65 at 305-307. 
80 Id. at 308.   
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international law, found that the federal government had both 
dominion and sovereignty in an absolute sense.     
English legal theory had posited that a “fundamental maxim and 
necessary legal principle” of land tenure is “the King is the universal 
lord and original proprietor of all in his kingdom” and that “all lands 
were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are [the tenures], 
therefore, holden, either mediately or immediately of the crown.”81 
American legal theorists adopted the same principle.82 From this 
legal construct, it would follow that an independent sovereign 
Georgia, as successor to the Crown, would be the ultimate source of 
unencumbered title. Nevertheless, the Fletcher Court, after ruling 
that Georgia did indeed have possession and authority to transfer the 
land in question, did not hold that Georgia was the source of all land 
titles as sovereign.    
First, the Court preserved the derivation of title from the British 
Crown as to the exterior boundaries of the territory.  After a long 
recitation of the respective transfers of land under the British Crown, 
the Court noted that the Proclamation of 1763 was:  
 
 
81 BLACKSTONE, supra, note 23 at 50, 52 n. 6. 
82 It is a fundamental principle in the English law, derived from the maxims of 
the feudal tenures, that the king was the original proprietor of all the land in the 
kingdom, and the true and only source of title.1 In this country we have adopted 
the same principle, and applied it to our republican governments; and it is a 
settled and fundamental doctrine with us, that all valid individual title to land, 
within the United States, is derived from the grant of our own local 
governments, or from that of the United States, or from the crown, or royal, 
chartered governments established here prior to the revolution. This was the 
doctrine declared, in this state, in the case of Jackson v. Ingraham, and it was 
held to be a settled rule, that our courts could not take notice of any title to land 
not derived from our own state or colonial government, and duly verified by 
patent. Even with respect to the Indian reservation lands, of which they still 
retain the occupancy, the fee is supposed to reside in the state, and the validity 
of a patent has not hitherto been permitted to be drawn in question, under the 
pretext that the Indian right and title, as original lords of the soil, had not been 
extinguished. This was assumed to be the law of the land, by the Supreme Court 
of this state in Jackson v. Hudson,3 and the same doctrine has been repeatedly 
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States.4 The nature of the Indian 
title to lands lying within the jurisdiction of a state, though entitled to be 
respected by all courts until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be 
absolutely repugnant to a seizin in fee on the part of the government within 
whose jurisdiction the lands are situated. Such a claim may he consistently 
maintained, upon the principle which has been assumed, that the Indian title is 
reduced to mere occupancy. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 
LECTURE 50 OF THE FOUNDATION OF TITLE TO LAND, available at 
https://lonang.com/library/reference/kent-commentaries-american-law/kent-50/ 
[https://perma.cc/9CHL-Z8XP].    
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a temporary arrangement suspending, for a time, the 
settlement of the country reserved, and the powers of 
the royal governor within the territory reserved but is 
not conceived to amount to an alteration of the 
boundaries of the colony.83  
 
If the Court had wished to emphasize the limits and the authority of 
Georgia as a “sovereign and independent” entity, and recognized as 
such by Great Britain in the treaty ending the revolutionary war, this 
long recitation would have been unnecessary.84 The Court simply 
would have stated that the territory of Georgia was delimited by the 
convention between South Carolina and Georgia of April 1787, as 
described in the opinion. At that time, prior to the 1789 Constitution, 
both would have been sovereign and independent states with the 
authority and capacity to determine their own borders by mutual 
agreement. While mentioning the convention, the Court did not find 
it dispositive of the issue. Instead, the Court, relying on earlier 
British acts, clearly insisted that the state of Georgia existed only 
within the pre-existing limits of the colony of Georgia, which were 
drawn under the sovereign prerogative of the British Crown. 
Second, the derivation of title as to the exterior boundaries of 
Georgia was paralleled by the continued existence of Indian title, 
recognized by and derived from the Crown under the Doctrine of 
Discovery, and now held by the federal government.  Alienation was 
subject to national restrictions. The Court noted that Indian title was 
not absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State.85 
 
83 Fletcher 10 U.S. at 142. 
84 Id. at 141. 
85 The dissent of Justice Johnson suggests the radicalism of the Court’s 
reasoning in this regard. “We legislate upon the conduct of strangers or citizens 
within their [the Indian tribes] limits, but innumerable treaties formed with them 
acknowledge them to be an independent people, and the uniform practice of 
acknowledging their right of soil, by purchasing from them, and restraining all 
persons from encroaching on their territory, makes it unnecessary to insist upon 
their right of soil. Can, then, one nation be said to be seized of a fee-simple in 
lands, the right of soil of which is in another nation? It is awkward to apply the 
technical idea of fee simple to the interests of a nation, but I must consider an 
absolute right of soil as an estate to them and their heirs...In fact, if the Indian 
nations be the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other nation can be said to 
have the same interest in it.” Johnson went on to argue that the rights of the state 
to Indian lands within their boundaries was the right of pre-emption and the 
right of conquest which was ceded to the federal government. Id. at 146-47. In 
M’Intosh v. Johnson the Court found that such rights never belonged to the 
individual states. 
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At the same time, the conveyance could not diminish the Indian title. 
Notwithstanding the seisin in fee, “Indian title...was certainly to be 
respected by all courts, until it was legitimately extinguished.”86 As 
the M’Intosh Court noted a decade after Fletcher, Indian title was 
not “a right to property and dominion, but a mere right of 
occupancy. 87  Nevertheless, the Court’s pronouncement had the 
effect of precluding an ejectment action, thereby preserving federal 
supervision over the Indians, while maintaining Georgia title. Indian 
title was “to be respected by all Courts,” (emphasis added) but 
Georgia had no pre-emptive right to extinguish such title. As such, 
its title could not be sustained in state or federal courts against the 
tribes. Federal supremacy protects Indian title, notwithstanding a 
state conveyance. These restrictions were found in the nature of the 
constitution. 
 
Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, 
sovereign power, on whose legislature no other 
restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own 
constitution. She is a part of a large empire; she is a 
member of the American union; and that union has a 
constitution the supremacy of which all 
acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the 
legislatures of the several states, which none claim a 
right to pass.88  
 
Moreover, as the federal government was created by all the people 
of the several states, it possessed the right and inherited Royal 
prerogative which allowed it to encumber Georgia's title. In the end 
then, Georgia's conveyance of land in Fletcher, a conveyance that 
the legislature of Georgia had the authority to transact concerning 
land “within the State of Georgia” and under the jurisdiction of the 
state, could not undermine federal authority to determine the final 
disposition of land occupied by the tribes.89  Individual grantees 
needed the federal government to extinguish Indian title.  
 
86 Id. at 154. 
87 “As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not allowed to possess the 
prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign and independent nations.” STORY, 
supra note 31 at 15 §152. 
88 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136. 
89 Id. at 142. 
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Finally, the Court refused to find any sovereignty in Georgia’s 
assertion of title over its western lands as they became settled. The 
Court’s characterization of the land in question left little doubt that 
the Lockean civil society – the source of sovereignty -- was to be 
found at the national level. Given the argument made by the Plaintiff 
concerning the title to the western lands by right of conquest, the 
Court had the opportunity to find Georgia’s title in conquest or 
recognition of Great Britain but chose not to do so. Under 
international law, acquisition of title by conquest is an assertion of 
sovereign right or can lead to sovereignty.90 Rather, the international 
law precepts the Court used in Fletcher pointed away from finding 
any significance in Georgia’s title.  The land claimed and 
subsequently conveyed in Fletcher was considered “vacant” by the 
Court even though it was assuredly occupied by Indians. This use of 
the term “vacant” could not have been used without deliberation.  
The seizure and ownership of vacant land, as Georgia’s arms may 
have done in the revolutionary war, as opposed to settled or 
occupied land, does not bring the title of those lands within the ambit 
of sovereign authority.  According to Pufendorf, a state or group of 
men cannot acquire sovereignty over vacant land by seizing it by 
just force.  
 
For since no right inheres in such things [vacant 
lands] to prevent any man being able to claim them 
for his own ...no special title is needed to secure 
dominion over them, but mere physical apprehension 
with the intention to keep them for one’s own is 
enough. But since men are by nature all equal, and so 
no one is subject to another’s authority, it follows 
that mere force and seizure are not sufficient to 
constitute legitimate sovereignty over men, but that 
there is need of some other additional title. 
Therefore, when Grotius, Bk. II, Ch. iii, Section 4 
lays it down that, ‘Of things which properly belong 
to no one, two are capable of seizure, sovereignty and 
 
90 “But according to the law of nations, not only the person, who makes war 
upon just grounds; but any one whatever, engaged in regular and formal war, 
becomes absolute proprietor of everything which he takes from the enemy: so 
that all nations respect his title, and the title of all, who derive through him their 
claim to such possessions.” HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 
335 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901). 
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dominion, in so far as the latter is distinguished from 
the former”, the word “sovereignty” should not be 
taken in its proper sense, and as that which is 
exercised over men, but of sovereignty over 
territories, the effect of which is that no one should 
settle in them against our will, unless he is willing to 
become our subject.  For otherwise a man is not 
included in those things which belong to no one, but 
he who is not another’s is his own.91 
 
In Pufendorf’s terms, it appears that the Court placed sovereignty in 
the federal government. Georgia could not claim sovereignty over 
all individuals, citizens and non-citizens within its territory. 92 
Georgia could claim authority and title over the land, but the Court 
found that the authority over individuals – the Indians – lay in the 
national government.  For Indian title (which implies Indian 
occupation and use) is “certainly to be respected by all courts, until 
it be legitimately extinguished.” 93  The Court reinforced these 
restrictions by also noting that the restrictions of Indian title on fee 
simple ownership are due to the Proclamation of 1763, an act of the 
sovereign British Crown.  
The Court anchored its distinction between title and sovereignty 
by extending Lockean logic to the disposition of the lands. As 
Jefferson had observed, the nature and purpose of civil institutions 
and all land around and within a particular society, “are assumed by 
that society and subject to their allotment only.”  This may be done 
by “themselves, assembled collectively, or by their legislature, [or 
their] delegated sovereign authority.”  The Fletcher decision 
emphasized national authority and involved national sovereignty. 
The Court noted that the vacant land issue “within the United States” 
was “compromised” among the national government and the states.  
 
91  5 SAMUEL PUFENDORF,  SAMUEL PUFENDORF ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND 
NATIONS  (O.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather eds., Oceana Publications, Inc 
1964) (1688).  
92 Chief Justice John Marshall noted that “The jurisdiction of courts is a branch 
(emphasis in original) of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent 
sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute.  It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed 
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, 
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction....” 
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136 (1812). 
93 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142-43. 
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It was not for the individual states to allot territory in a Lockean 
sense – it was for the national government and national civil society.   
   
2. Johnson v. M’Intosh 
 
Johnson v. M’Intosh was an ejectment action brought by 
individuals who claimed title to land purchased from the United 
Illinois and Wabash Land Companies. The companies in turned 
claimed title based on a purchase from Indians in present-day 
Indiana and Illinois.94 The issue in M’Intosh was whether a valid 
title could be obtained from a tribe by a private purchaser. The Court 
found that the tribe could not convey good title because all title in 
the United States was grounded in the federal governments’ 
exclusive pre-emptive right to extinguish Indian title. Chief Justice 
Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, grounded this pre-emptive 
right as a corollary of the Discovery doctrine, an international law 
doctrine that equated “discovery” by European nations with 
exclusive title of the discovered land. Marshall recognized how 
“extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear” nevertheless held the 
title did not depend upon European occupation or conquest for its 
validity.95  This “conquest by discovery” thesis wedded sovereign 
radical title and the extinguishment of Indian title, aspects of 
sovereignty that were incidental to state sovereignty under the 
Compact Theory, on the one hand, with international participation 
and recognition, characteristics possessed only by the federal 
government as successor in interest to the British Crown on the other 
hand.   
Modifying and elaborating on Fletcher,96 the Court returned to 
the concept that all title in America ultimately resided in the 
 
94M’Intosh, supra note 30. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great 
Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 67 (2001).  
95 M’Intosh, 21 U.S at 591. 
96 In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court considered the question of whether the “vacant 
lands within the United States became joint property, or belonged to the separate 
states”.  Marshall, C.J. writing for the Court noted that at one time  this issue 
“threatened to shake the American confederacy to its foundation” held that all 
title to all lands conquered or occupied during the War of Independence went to 
“the people of the several states.” Chief Justice Marshall noted that “[A]ll the 
right and Royal prerogative devolved upon all the people of the several states, to 
be exercised in such manner as they should prescribe, and by such governments 
as they should erect.  The right of dispose of the lands belonging to a state 
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sovereign and that this title to land was the direct result of the 
sovereign participating in the international system. 
 
While the different nations of Europe respected the 
rights of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the 
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed 
and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate 
dominion, a power to grant soil, while yet in 
possession of the natives. These grants have been 
understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, 
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.97 
 
The Discovery doctrine, as understood by Marshall, allowed the 
European states to claim “[a]n absolute dominion” over lands not 
yet occupied by them -- not by virtue of any conquest of, or cession 
by, the Indian natives, but as a right acquired by discovery.  As such 
Indian title was not “a right to property and dominion, but a mere 
right of occupancy.”98  
 
All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the 
crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, 
and recognize the absolute title of the crown to 
extinguish that right.  This is incompatible with an 
absolute and complete title in the Indians.99 
 
This title was exclusive, and the tribes could dispose of property 
only according to the rules of the discoverer state. “An absolute 
title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or 
in different governments.”100 As the federal government was 
successor in interest to the British Crown and held sole pre-
emptive rights to extinguish Indian title, a private purchaser of 
 
naturally devolved upon the legislative body; who were to enact such laws as 
should authorize the sale and conveyance of them. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 121. 
97 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574. 
98 “As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not allowed to possess the 
prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign and independent nations.” STORY, 
supra note 31, §152. 
99 M’Intosh 21 U.S. at 588. 
100 Id. at 587. 
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Indian lands held no title.101 In short, despite tribal occupancy and 
use of their traditional territories, the tribes held no legal title 
recognized under the Discover’s law to their territory 
The facts of M’Intosh provided an opportunity for the Court to 
acknowledge the pre-existing sovereignty of the states from the 
1776 Declaration of Independence because Virginia, which held 
title to the land prior to transferring it the federal government, had 
rejected the land claim in 1779, 10 years prior to the creation of the 
federal government in 1789. If the state and federal governments 
were co-benefactors of the British Crown’s sovereign rights under 
the Discovery doctrine, if Virginia was a sovereign state under 
international law prior to 1789 and thus successor-in-interest of the 
British Crown,  if national sovereignty was in some sense dependent 
on Virginia acceding to the 1789 constitution “as a state,” then land 
title to the area would have definitively passed to Virginia (as an 
international state) and subsequently to the national government 
when Virginia ceded the land to the Confederation Congress in 
1784. In such circumstances, the 1779 rejection of the claim by the 
Virginia legislature would have conclusively ended the matter.  
Marshall, however, argues that Virginia’s sovereignty and 
independence from the onset of the Revolutionary War did not have 
the quality necessary for Virginia to assume international rights and 
obligations. First, he equivocated on the point that the 1783 
international treaty ending the War of Independence was an 
acknowledgement of individual state, as opposed to national 
sovereignty.  
By this treaty [that ended the War of Independence], 
the powers of government, and the right to soil, 
passed definitively to these States. We had before 
taken possession of them, by declaring 
independence; but neither the declaration of 
independence, nor the treaty confirming it, could 
give us more than which we before possessed, or to 
which Great Brian was entitled.  It has never been 
doubted, that either the United States, or the several 
 
101 Moreover, the extinguishment of Indian title by the federal government did 
not provide fee simple title to a previous purchaser of land from the Indians; the 
federal government could convey land over which it had extinguished Indian 
title regardless of the previous purchase. 
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states, had clear title to all the lands within the 
boundary lines described in the treaty....102  
 
If the Court had understood Virginia as possessing both internal 
sovereignty and external sovereignty after 1783, it would have been 
unnecessary to contrapose the “United States or the several states”, 
particularly where Marshall in the earlier Fletcher case rejected the 
argument that the territory conquered by American revolutionary 
forces during the war was the property of the United States. 103 
Second, Marshall questioned Virginia’s power (as opposed to right) 
to rescind the title obtained by the original M’Intosh purchasers, a 
rather curious observation given Virginia’s assertion of sovereignty 
over the area -- unless one assumes that Virginia held only a 
subsidiary sovereignty under the British Crown and American 
national government. In response to petitions to recognize the 
transaction, Virginia had passed legislation in 1779 declaring 
Virginia’s exclusive right to purchase Indian land and annulling any 
previous purchases by private parties. This 1779 legislation could 
have been construed by the Court as voiding the United Illinois and 
Wabash Land Companies purchase. However, Marshall did not hold 
the 1779 Act dispositive as an exhibition of Virginia’s sovereign 
state legislative power; rather he found it to be an additional example 
of the practice that colonial governments had historically claimed 
exclusive rights to purchase land from the Indians.  
 
Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling 
vested rights, or admitting it to countervail the 
testimony furnished by the marginal note opposite to 
the title of the law, forbidding purchases from the 
Indians, in the revivals of the Virginia statutes, 
stating that law to be repealed, it may safely be 
considered as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part 
of Virginia, of the broad principle which had always 
been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase 
from the Indians resided in the government.104 
 
 
102 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584-85 (Emphasis added). 
103 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142. 
104 Id. at 585. 
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Instead, the Court reached back toward the idea that only one 
international sovereign can be the source of all title. It grounded 
that title on the right of self-preservation and conquest, legal rights 
only within the provenance of an international sovereign. In doing 
so, it excluded the states as a locus of complete sovereignty. 
Marshall’s nationalist perspective lies in his finding that Indian 
sovereignty was immediately diminished by European discovery (as 
an extension of state- sanctioned or affirmed exploration) and tribes 
or individual Indians had no natural right to the lands they occupied. 
That the Discovery doctrine necessarily diminishes Indian title or 
that the “[c]onquest gives title which the Courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny” was not new. 105  However, by articulating the 
“conquest by discovery” thesis, the M’Intosh Court forcefully 
asserted that the tribes had neither international rights nor natural or 
positive rights save what the European conquers granted them or 
what they maintained for themselves by force. This was contrary to 
recognized international practice, but the Court noted: “The law 
which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations 
between the conqueror and the conquered, was incapable of 
application to a people under such circumstances.”106 Thus even if 
tribes wished to recognize and sell individual property, thereby 
enabling them to improve and cultivate the land and exercise their 
natural law right to property, they could not. Likewise, a grant of 
individual property could not “separate the Indian from his nation, 
nor give a title which our Courts could distinguish from the title of 
his tribe....” unless the sale was recognized in a treaty.107 The Court, 
emphasizing the legal effects of the Discovery doctrine, 
 
105 Id. at 588. Vattel, for example, wrote: “Their [the Indians] unsettled 
habitation in those immense regions cannot be accounted a true and legal 
possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up at home, finding land 
of which the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they made no 
actual and constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it and settle 
it with colonies.  The earth, as we have already observed, belongs to mankind in 
general, and was designed to furnish them with subsistence; if each nation had, 
from the beginning, resolved to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the 
people might live only by hunting, fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not 
be sufficient to maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants.  We do not 
therefore, deviate from the views of nature, in confining the Indians within 
narrower limits.” E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, §209 (Chitty Ed., 1883); 
See also L.C. Green, Claims to Territory in Colonial America, in THE LAW OF 
NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD (The Univ. of Alberta Press, 1989). 
106 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 596. 
107Id. at 593. 
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characterized the tribes as dependent nations regardless of their 
actual dependence or independence in fact. 108 
Without a natural right to their lands or sovereignty, the tribes 
would need to claim various rights under positive international law 
as sovereign, independent people or derive whatever rights they had 
from the municipal law of the sovereign. The Discovery doctrine 
presumptively eliminated any rights under international law, but 
Marshall nevertheless understood the doctrine as incorporating legal 
rights to occupancy into the municipal legal system based on the 
tribes’ formerly independent and sovereign status.  
 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the 
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; 
but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.  They 
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a 
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use 
it according to their own discretion; but their rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil 
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by 
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it.109 
 
These rights were necessarily incorporated into federal law because 
it was the sole successor-in-interest to the British Crown and held 
radical title to all lands over which Indian title had not been 
extinguished.  
Actual relations with the Indians reinforced the national 
character of the Indian rights based on the international status of the 
federal government and the former pre-discovery status of the tribes. 
According to the Court, the peculiar relationship between the 
British/Americans and the Indians was similar to, but differed in 
many respects, from the political relations among foreign nations. 
Practices similar to international intercourse, such as diplomatic 
exchanges and entering into treaties with tribes, were carried out 
because the tribes were “yet too powerful and brave not to be 
dreaded as formidable enemies.”110 The reasons for this were not 
 
108 Id. at 597. 
109 Id. at 574. 
110 Id. at 596. 
 189 
principled but practical. The Indians were “fierce savages” who 
could not be “safely governed as a distinct people” until the 
“conquest is complete.”111 Hence:  
 
Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as 
occupants...However this restriction may be opposed 
to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, 
yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which 
the country has been settled, and be adapted to the 
actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, 
be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be 
rejected by Courts of justice.112  
 
Under the circumstances where assertions of dominium are: 1) 
legally efficacious; and 2) pretensions to be realized only through 
cession, acquiesce or conquest of the tribes; or 3) the results of actual 
conquest by military force, the Discovery doctrine ultimately 
resolves itself into an issue of the United States’ right of self-
preservation and right of conquest.  
 
We will not enter into the controversy, whether 
agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a 
right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the 
territory they possess, or to contract their limits.  
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the 
conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and 
speculative opinions of individuals may be, 
respecting the original justice of the claim which has 
been successfully asserted.  The British government, 
which was then our government, and whose rights 
have passed to the United States, asserted a title to all 
the lands occupied by Indians, within the chartered 
limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a 
limited sovereignty over them, and the exclusive 
right of extinguishing the title which occupancy gave 
to them.  These claims have been maintained and 
 
111 Id. at 587-88. 
112 Id. at 591-92. 
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established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the 
sword.113 
 
The states are incompetent in this regard. Discovery and the claim 
of absolute dominium is an assertion of power “now possessed by 
the government of the United States, to grant lands, [and it] resided, 
while we were colonies, in the crown or its grantees.” The predations 
of the tribes threatened the security of the crown and its grantees. 
Self-preservation is a natural right of the sovereign. The United 
States has both the right and duty to defend itself as a sovereign 
entity. As Pufendorf pointed out, “The general rule for the conduct 
of supreme sovereigns is: Let the safety of the people be the supreme 
law…For sovereignty is conferred upon them with the intention that 
through it there may be secured the end for which states are 
established.”114  
This natural right of the federal government to defend its citizens 
and the corresponding denial of any natural right of the tribes is 
mirrored by the Court’s denial of a state’s natural right of 
sovereignty under Lockean principles. The Court refused to find 
natural or positive rights in the Lockean claim to state sovereignty – 
a presumption which underlay the Compact Theory.115 It would not 
 
113 Id. at 588. 
114 PUFENDORF, supra note 91 at 18-19.  
115 The states generally did not justify their occupation and possession of lands 
was not based on positive international law or as successors-in-interest to the 
prerogatives of the British Crown. Rather they based their claims on a Lockean 
conception of society and property. Locke argued things in nature that were 
removed from their natural state by human labor became that individual’s 
property. For those whose settled the frontier, Locke stated that “he who 
appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but increases the 
common stock of mankind.” John Locke, Two Treatise of Government in Man 
and the State: The Political Philosophers 336 (Saxe Commines & Robert N. 
Linscott eds., 1963); The resultant formula held that individuals and their 
sovereign states had both the right and duty to possess and develop the wild and 
vacant lands held by the Indians. Thomas Jefferson stated this thesis in “A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America” in 1774: “The fictitious 
principle that all lands belong originally to the king, they [the colonists] were 
early persuaded to believe real, and accordingly took grants of their own from 
the crown....It is time therefore for us to lay this matter before his majesty, and 
to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself. From the nature and 
purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the limits which any particular 
society has circumscribed around itself, are assumed by that society and subject 
to their allotment only. This may be done by themselves, assembled collectively, 
or by their legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority: 
and, if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each individual of the society 
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speculate “whether agriculturalist, merchants, and manufacturers, 
have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the 
territory they possess, or to contract their limits.”116 Rather the title 
of lands and ultimate dominion is acquired and maintained by force. 
This is not to say that the Court did not ascribe to a Lockean view 
of political society. Instead, the society it focused on was decidedly 
national. Marshall noted this when he acknowledged the incongruity 
between natural law and the position advanced by the Court:  
 
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by 
which property may be acquired and preserved is not, 
and cannot be drawn into question; as the title to 
lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend 
entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie; it 
will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to 
examine, not singly those principles of abstract 
justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed 
on the mind of his creature man, and which are 
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of 
civilized nations, whose perfect independence is 
acknowledged; but those principles also which our 
own government has adopted in a particular case, and 
given us as the rule of our decision.117  
  
The national character of Locke’s political society is further 
elaborated by the Court when it asserts “Conquest gives title that the 
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.”118 The Court is national; the 
conquest is national. The right of conquest—and conquest by force 
of law under the Discovery doctrine—is held only by the absolute 
sovereign under international law.  
The national focus is further evidenced by the different 
characterizations of Indian lands given by the Court in M’Intosh and 
the earlier Fletcher case. Marshall writing for the Fletcher majority 
 
may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will 
give him title.” Thomas Jefferson, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 18-19 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1985); For a discussion of the Lockean argument used 
by the states, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN 
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 287-
317 (1990). 
116 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587. 
117 Id. at 572. 
118 Id. at 588. 
 192 
described the Indian lands subject to the dispute as “vacant”; a 
characterization seemingly disputed by Justice Johnson’s dissent. In 
Fletcher, Johnson had argued that the tribes in the disputed area 
“retain a limited sovereignty, and the absolute proprietorship of their 
soil.” 119  As vacant land, the Crown would have assumed 
sovereignty and title. From this nationalist perspective, the 
contentious issue that existed between the Federal government and 
Georgia, the issue of who held sovereignty or radical title, or the 
nature of Indian title, simply disappears. The only question for the 
Court was whether the Georgia legislature could convey the land. 
The M’Intosh Court characterized the Indian land and the assertion 
of sovereignty by the Crown under the legal pretext of discovery 
quite differently.120  
Thus, the colonies were an extension of the sovereign authority 
of the Crown, and the territory “discovered” was already part of the 
nation that discovered it. Discovery occurs and possession is taken 
prior to actual occupation under the authority of an existing imperial 
government. Yet the territory over which sovereignty was asserted 
in M’Intosh was not deemed vacant or terra nullius. It was occupied 
by tribes, who the Court admitted, were “rightful occupants of the 
soil” and who were “in fact independent.”121 Marshall describes 
them as “fierce savages,” whose occupation was war and who “were 
as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to 
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.”122 Given this 
characterization from an international law perspective, the conquest 
of such peoples, either by force or by law, is an affirmation of 
sovereignty.  Where force is necessary, it is the prerogative of the 
national sovereign government. For the right to use force, according 
to Vattel, “or to make war, is given to Nations only for their defense 
and for the maintenance of their rights....”123 This right to wage just 
war is the sole prerogative of sovereigns and “[w]ar in a just cause 
 
119 Johnson concludes: “What, then, practically, is the interest of the states in the 
soil of the Indians within their boundaries?  Unaffected by particular treaties, it 
is nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the country, to 
wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors within 
certain defined limits.” This right could not be conveyed by Georgia legislature. 
Fletcher at 10 U.S. 102- 103. 
120 See also LINDLEY, supra note 52, at 114. 
121M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574, 586. 
122 Id. at 590.  
123 VATTEL, supra note 33, at 243. 
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is therefore, according to the natural law...a natural mode of 
acquiring title.”124  
  
3. Cherokee Nation v.  Georgia 
 
M’Intosh held that the exclusive power of extinguishing Indian 
title allowed the federal government to enter into treaties or go to 
war to clear the land for settlement. This power descended from 
Great Britain and was established by the M’Intosh Court to be part 
of the natural right to self-preservation and just war. Yet the rights 
under natural and international law (and established by British 
practice) that would have normally been accorded a conquered 
people were not available to the tribes. After M’Intosh, the legal 
nature of Indian tribes and how these entities would enter into the 
American legal system became increasingly important as the tribes 
sought to use the courts to defend themselves in the face of increased 
settlement and declining military power.   
One means of securing rights “within” the American legal 
system was by treaty yet the notion that treaties would be used to 
incorporate the tribes into the American federal system brought a 
new set of issues.  A treaty under the Supremacy Clause of the 1789 
Constitution led to an assertion of federal authority in areas that may 
be reserved for the states. This had been a longstanding objection to 
the constitution, and the extension of federal power faced increased 
political opposition from the states.125 There also remained the issue 
of how the pre-existing sovereignty and independence of the tribes 
would be incorporated into the federal system. The Compact Theory 
and the National Supremacy Theory both assumed that the 
sovereignty of the people of the United States was singular and 
unitary; that is the sovereign people delegated various powers to 
their chosen units of government.  Recognition of Indian 
sovereignty and independence within the internal boundaries of the 
United States, but outside of the categories established by American 
 
124 Id. at 307. 
125 “And the senate has moreover, various and great executive powers, viz., in 
concurrence with the president-general, they form treaties with foreign nations, 
that may control and abrogate the constitutions and laws of the several states.  
Indeed, there is no power, privilege or liberty of the state governments, or of the 
people, but what may be affected by virtue of this power.” The Address and 
reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the convention of Pennsylvania to their 
Constituents, December 18, 1787 in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the 
Constitutional Convention Debates 251 (Ralph Ketcham, ed. (1986). 
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political theory, the constitution, and international law, threatened 
the underlying assumption of complete internal sovereignty of the 
American people and the external sovereignty of the United States.  
As Justice Johnson noted in his concurrence in Cherokee Nation: 
 
We had then just emerged ourselves from a situation 
having much stronger claims than the Indians for 
admission into the family of nations; and yet we were 
not admitted, until we had declared ourselves no 
longer provinces, but states, and showed some 
earnestness and capacity in asserting our claim to be 
enfranchised. Can it be supposed, that when using 
those terms [“foreign” and “state” as found in the 
constitution], we meant to include any others than 
those who were admitted into the community of 
nations, of whom, most notoriously, the Indians were 
no part?126  
 
For the Court that espoused the pre-eminent version of the federal 
government, the recognition of Indian sovereignty and 
independence within the borders of the United States brought 
additional problems.  For example, if Indian sovereignty (even if 
only a residual of pre-existing sovereignty and independence prior 
to conquest and discovery) was accorded recognition by the courts, 
it would add force to the argument that each states’ pre-existing 
internal sovereignty and external sovereignty was in some sense a 
check on federal sovereignty. As Justice Johnson pointed out above, 
the states had “much stronger claims...for admission to the family of 
nations....”   
The Court resolved these issues in Cherokee Nation, which 
concerned the right of the Cherokee Tribe, pursuant to a treaty with 
the federal government, to directly enforce its treaty rights in federal 
court. The Cherokee commenced an original action for an injunction 
in the United States Supreme Court to prevent Georgia from 
extending its jurisdiction over a reservation established by a federal 
treaty. The laws of Georgia, the Cherokee alleged, “go directly to 
annihilate the Cherokees as a political society and to seize...the lands 
of the nation which have been assured them by the United States 
 
126 Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 26 (1831). 
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Government, in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in 
force.”127  
The Court began its analysis by admitting that the Cherokee 
were a “distinct and independent society.” 
 
So much of the argument as was intended to prove 
the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct 
political society, separated from others, capable of 
managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in 
the opinion of a majority of judges, been completely 
successful.  They have been uniformly treated as a 
state, from the settlement of our country.128 
 
Yet, for the majority of the judges, the existence of an independent 
Cherokee nation was not enough.  For purposes of Article III of the 
1789 Constitution, the Court concluded that Indian tribes were not 
“foreign states” and the Court therefore did not have jurisdiction.129  
Building on the distinction between sovereignty and independence 
he delineated in Johnson, Justice Marshall commented that foreign 
nations are generally “nations not owing a common allegiance” to 
each other.  However, “[i]ndian territory is admitted to compose a 
part of the United States:”   
 
In all the Cherokee dealings with the United States 
they are considered within the jurisdictional limits of 
the United States.  Moreover, they acknowledge 
themselves, in their treaties, to be under the 
protection of the United States, [and] they admit that 
the United States shall have the sole and exclusive 
right of regulating trade with them and managing 
their affairs as they think proper....130   
 
 
127Id. at 14. 
128 Id. Of the five Justices who participated in the case three (Marshall, 
Thompson, Story, JJ) recognized the Cherokee as a “state.” Marshall did not 
find them to be a foreign state for purposes of Article III. Johnson and Baldwin, 
JJ did not recognize the Cherokee as a state. 
129 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens, or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
130 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15. 
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Rather than deeming the Cherokee an independent foreign state, the 
majority held that the Cherokee and other tribes are “domestic 
dependent nations [that] are in a state of pupilage; [and] their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”131   
Given that the M’Intosh Court emphasized that conquest and 
war were the currency of American-Indian relations, the use of the 
ward-guardian relationship is curious. Analogizing the ward-
guardian relationship to aboriginal people had circulated for some 
time, and it was ascribed to in other colonial jurisdictions, but it was 
not widely accepted at the time. 132  Nevertheless, the use of the 
concept in the treaty context suggests  incorporation of the tribes 
into the American legal system under the authority and protection of 
the federal government. While under this ward-guardian 
relationship, the ward tribe has no rights save those asserted or 
recognized by the federal government, it is nevertheless presumed 
that there are a set of legally protected interests held the protected 
party. 
It is also curious that even from its nationalistic perspective, the 
Court found that Indian “nations” were competent to make a treaty 
or contract without recognizing the corresponding right to enforce 
the contract in federal court. For the Court, Indian relations 
remained essentially issues of war and peace, or federal domination. 
In international law, the Indian tribes were conquered people who 
 
131 Id. at 27.  
132 Vitoria stated that there may be instances where “It might therefore be 
maintained that in their own interests [the Indians] the sovereigns of Spain might 
undertake the administration of their country...so long as this was clearly for 
their benefit.” He doubted however that the idea would not be abused. Francisco 
de Vitoria, De Indis et De Ivre Belli Relectiones, in THE CLASSICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-161 §18 (Ernest Nys ed., James Brown Scott ed., 
John Pawley Bate trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc., 1964); It is said that Edmund 
Burke first formulated the duties of a colonial power in terms of trusteeship in a 
speech in the House of Commons on Fox’s India Bill of 1783. “All political 
power which is set over men...ought in some way or other exercised ultimately 
for their benefit. If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion, 
and every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be original 
self-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders, then 
such rights or privileges, or whatever else you chuse (sic) to call them, are all, in 
the strictest sense, a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be 
rendered accountable: and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies 
from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence.” LINDLEY,  
supra note 52, at 330.  
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had, despite the Court’s rhetoric, ceased to be a states.133 Prior to 
their elimination as independent states however, the “habits and 
usages” of Indian relations were essentially a government-to-
government policy matter which did not include a consideration of 
the respective rights by the federal courts.  The Court noted: 
 
At the time the constitution was framed, the idea of 
appealing to an American court of justice for an 
assertion of right or redress of wrong, had perhaps 
never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe.  
Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the 
government.  This was well understood by the 
statesmen who framed the constitution....134 
 
Thus, the Cherokee Nation Court, by refusing jurisdiction, was 
simply emphasizing the international status that had once existed 
with the tribes and their now conquered status.  The residual nature 
of the relationship precluded both the Court and the states from 
interfering with the policy of the federal government political 
branches.  
It has been argued that the decision in Cherokee Nation avoided 
a political crisis between the Court and federal government, on the 
one hand, and the Jackson Administration and the states on the 
other.135 However, in avoiding a political crisis, the Court reasserted 
federal authority in three ways. 
First, Marshall limited the reach of the Eleventh amendment to 
its terms in the case.136 Georgia, claiming sovereign immunity, had 
 
133 “But a people, that has passes under the domination of another, can no longer 
form a state, and in direct manner make use of the law of nations.  Such were the 
people and kingdoms which the Romans rendered subject to their empire; the 
most, even of those whom they had honored with the name of friends and allies, 
no longer formed states. Within themselves they were governed by their own 
laws and magistrates; but without, they were in everything obliged to follow the 
orders of Rome; they dared not of themselves make either war or an alliance, 
and could not treat with nations.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or 
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations 
and Sovereigns 18, § 11 (Dublin, Ireland: Luke White,1792). 
134 Id. at 17. 
135 See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and 
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 514-16 (1969). 
136 The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
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refused to answer or accept the jurisdiction of the Court in the case. 
Marshall cited Article III, Section 2 of the constitution, and stated 
that “the party defendant [Georgia] may unquestionably be sued in 
this court.” In so holding, Marshall indicated that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not grant Georgia or any state a general defense of 
sovereign immunity. He asserted federal jurisdiction over states in 
those areas beyond the terms of the amendment, a broad 
interpretation in an era of increasingly strident assertions of state 
authority.   
Second, Marshall set the groundwork for the federal pre-
emption of all state authority over tribes under the Indian Commerce 
Clause. The Cherokee argued that the commerce clause intended “to 
give the whole power of managing” Indian affairs to the federal 
government, thus “removing those doubts in which the management 
of Indian affairs” that had prevailed under the Articles of 
Confederation.137  Marshall agreed to the exclusive constitutional 
grant of authority to the federal government, even though his 
reasoning did not confer jurisdiction.  
 
Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the 
view of the convention; this exclusive authority of 
regulating intercourse with them might have been, 
and, most probably, would have been, specifically 
given, in language indicating that idea, not in 
language contradistinguishing them from foreign 
nation.138  
 
This broad grant of legislative power, excluding or precluding state 
jurisdiction, recapitulated McCulloch while going beyond the 
justification for federal authority under the dormant commerce 
clause outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden.139   
Third, the Court avoided a political crisis by reasserting the 
position that certain disputes concerning external sovereignty and 
international law—recognition of foreign states, when a state of war 
exists, or how to dispose of confiscated property during hostilities—
are questions of “policy” rather than of “law” and continue to 
 
137 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19.  
138 Id. (emphasis added). 
139 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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reserve these issues for the federal government.140 The judiciary had 
the duty “to decide upon individual rights, according to those 
principles which political departments of the nation have 
established.” It did not have jurisdiction to decide those great issues 
involving a sovereign in its external relations. 141  From this 
perspective, the federal government retained absolute internal and 
external sovereignty. The issue of whether Indian treaties were 
enforceable obligations depended upon the federal political 
departments.142 The authority, however, including the authority to 
pre-empt and override state jurisdiction, remained in the federal 
government as a whole. 143  The sovereign always retained the 
authority to disregard a treaty and face whatever internal or 
international disapprobation that might arise.  
 
4. Worcester v. Georgia 
 
It is ironic that the Court cited the “former” sovereignty of the 
tribes to justify continued and permanent domination of them by the 
federal government in Cherokee Nation. The tribes’ “diminished” 
sovereignty had its roots in international law and was the 
consequence of the Discovery doctrine set forth in M’Intosh.  In 
Worcester v. Georgia, the Court extended this notion and asserted 
the pre-existing and pre-eminent sovereignty of the national 
government by virtue of its international relations with the tribes.144 
At the same time, it denied the pre-existing sovereignty of the states 
and their incapacity to act in the international sphere as did the 
tribes.145  
 
140 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1814); see also Schooner 
Exch., 11 U.S. at 135. 
141 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 415, 433 (1829). 
142 Chief Justice John Marshall noted that “The jurisdiction of courts is a branch 
(emphasis in original) of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent 
sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute.  It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed 
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, 
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction....” 
Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 136. 
143 For a further discussion of the Law-Politics distinction as Marshall 
understood the term, see William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century 
Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 
893, 944-953 (1978). 
144 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515. 
145 Id.  
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M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Fletcher were used by the 
individual states to extend their jurisdiction to individual Indians, 
tribes and Indian country. 146  They argued that the effect of the 
Discovery doctrine as outlined in M’Intosh, and the idea that the 
Indian title was not incompatible with state possession of the land in 
Fletcher,  precluded the tribes from exercising full sovereignty over 
their territory and their members while providing them with only a 
permissive occupancy of their lands. 147  This occupancy, which 
provided for a nomadic non-agricultural lifestyle, could not interfere 
with the advance of the frontier. Moreover, the extension of state 
jurisdiction and termination of the permissive use was a matter of 
policy and was not reviewable by courts.148 Federal efforts, either 
by treaty or through the commerce power to protect Indians and 
prevent the extension of state jurisdiction were unconstitutional 
because they impermissibly trenched on state sovereignty.   
No state was more assertive in this regard than Georgia. Georgia 
had ceded its western territory (which subsequently became 
Alabama and Mississippi) in 1802 to the United States with the 
understanding that the federal government would extinguish Indian 
title within its remaining borders as quickly as possible. After gold 
was discovered in territory reserved to the Cherokee by treaty, 
Georgia had passed a series of laws assuming jurisdiction over 
 
146 See Caldwell v. The State, 1 Ala. 327 (1832), where Saffold, J. of the 
Alabama Supreme Court noted: “The circumstance of the United States having 
the ultimate right of soil, cannot impair the right of sovereignty. There is no 
incongruity in the proposition that the right to the public domain resides in the 
United States, while the ordinary right of empire, over the same territory, is 
vested in the state government. Such is, and has been, the condition of most or 
all the new states. While the United States have possessed and exercised the 
right to dispose of the unappropriated lands, and even to remove intruders from 
them, the states, containing them, have, as uniformly, exercised the ordinary 
municipal government.”  
147 “The majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian title, 
which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately 
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part 
of the state.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142-43. 
148 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall stated “That part of the bill which respects the 
land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their 
possession, may be more doubtful.  The mere question of right might perhaps be 
decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties.  But the court is asked 
to do more than decide on the title.  The bill requires us to control the legislature 
of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force.  The propriety of 
such an interposition by the court may be well questioned.  It savours too much 
of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial 
department.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 39.  
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Cherokee country after efforts to move them west by mutual 
agreement had failed.  
Worcester involved the arrest and conviction by Georgia of a 
U.S. citizen who had entered Cherokee country to proselytize under 
a federal law but contrary to Georgia law. The Court reversed the 
conviction stating that: “the whole power of regulating the 
intercourse with [the Indians] is vested in the United States” and 
Georgia had no jurisdiction over the Cherokee territory established 
by federal treaty. 149  Historically, the Court noted, the power of 
regulating the relationship with the Indians did not extend to the 
regulation of their internal affairs. Marshall noted, “He [the king] 
...never intruded into the interior of their affairs or interfered with 
their self-government so far as respected themselves only.”150 This 
condition was guaranteed by treaties, first with the British Crown 
and later with the United States. As the Cherokee nation is 
recognized by treaty as a separate independent entity, state authority 
within Indian country is “extra-territorial” and ultra vires. 
 
The Cherokee nation, then, is distinct occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, 
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, in 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, 
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or 
in conformity with the treaties and with the acts of 
Congress.  The whole intercourse between the 
United States and this nation, is, by our constitution 
and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States.151  
 
The decision in Worcester was not enforced.  Either President 
Jackson refused to enforce the ruling or deficiencies in federal law 
made enforcement impracticable.152   
Marshall grounded the opinion in Worcester on international law 
and concepts of federal supremacy arguing that the establishment of 
 
149 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 501.   
150 “[O]ur history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country, 
of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of 
the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as 
traders or otherwise, who might seduce them into foreign alliances.” Id. at 496. 
151 Id. at 561. 
152 Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and 
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525 (1969). 
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the United States through the 1783 Treaty ending the Revolutionary 
War did not include full recognition of internal and external 
sovereignty in each of the states while full sovereignty passed to the 
national American government. Echoing McCulloch and the 
commerce power case Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court argued that the 
change from the Articles of Confederation to the 1789 Constitution 
fundamentally altered the relationship between the states and the 
federal government. 153  Marshall opined again that the 1789 
constitution provided that federal authority was supreme within the 
sphere of its enumerated powers: 154  
 
That instrument [the U.S. Constitution] confers on 
congress the powers of war and peace: of making 
treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes.  These powers comprehend all that is 
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the 
Indians.  They are not limited by any restrictions on 
their free action.  The shackles imposed on this 
power, in the confederation, are discarded.155 
 
The fundamental pre-eminence of the federal government under the 
1789 constitution was not the sole factor in the Court’s decision.  
The Court, as it did in M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation, firmly 
grounded the tribes within the ambit of international law 
recognizing the previous sovereignty of the tribes and their 
exclusive intercourse with the Federal government.  
 Marshall argued that the Discovery Doctrine did not provide the 
states with sovereignty over the tribes because diminished tribal 
sovereignty remained while ultimate radical title vested in the 
federal government. The states could not extend their sovereign and 
jurisdiction over the tribes because the basis of their sovereignty was 
exclusively territorial. 
 As mentioned above international law theorists posited that the 
sovereignty of a state consisted of two parts, internal sovereignty 
 
153 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1. 
154 Charles F. Hobson argues that the principle significance of Gibbons lay “not 
so much in building up and centralizing federal power as in circumscribing state 
power.” CHARLES F.  HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 138-149 (1996).  
155 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 500. 
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and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the “right of 
control” which is inherent in the people of any state, or vested in 
its ruler, by the constitution or by municipal law.  
The sovereign state had both the right and duty to preserve its 
existence and expect the obedience of individuals who lived within 
its border to abide by its rules. This control over individuals and the 
authority to make binding law, was the primary paramount 
difference between a sovereign and non-sovereign state.156   
From this perspective, the Discovery doctrine does not provide 
the discovering nation with sovereignty over the tribes. The 
Discovery doctrine, Marshall wrote: 
 
[R]egulated the right given by discovery among the 
European discoverers but could not affect the rights 
of those already in possession, either as aboriginal 
occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery 
made before the memory of man.  It gave the 
exclusive right to purchase but did not found that 
right on a denial of the right of the possessor to 
sell.157  
 
This diminished international sovereignty preserves the right of self-
government to the tribes and provides the federal government with 
the exclusive right (as international sovereign) to incorporate the 
tribes into the American federal system or the internal sovereignty 
of the United States. The incorporation was either through tribal 
agreement by way of treaty, by which a tribe does not lose its 
residual sovereignty, or by conquest. 
This tribal sovereignty is contrasted to the sovereignty of the 
individual states. The Court found that the practices of European 
nations and the United States treated the tribes as international 
sovereigns. 
   
The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our 
own language, selected in our diplomatic and 
legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a 
definite and well understood meaning.  We have 
 
156 4 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo in THE 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (1964). 
157 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 495. 
 204 
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to 
the other nations of the earth.158  
 
These practices, as set forth in British foreign policy documents and 
American treaties, treated the Indians as equals under international 
law. For the most part, the tribes, as was generally acknowledged 
and required by international practices, had voluntarily agreed to 
enter into treaties ceding territory. Thus, in the Worcester Court’s 
opinion, the tribes had some external sovereignty at least at the time 
they signed the treaties regardless of whether their land lay within 
the external borders of the United States. The diminished 
sovereignty of the tribes due to the operation of the Discovery 
doctrine is irrelevant in this analysis as the capacity of the tribes to 
wage war (as allies or enemies) conferred on them an international 
though dependent status. The relationship then created by treaties is 
delimited by and grounded in international law. The Court stated 
(quoting Vattel) “[t]ributary and feudatory states do not thereby 
cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-
government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the 
administration of the state.”159  
Further while the tribes were recognized as independent and 
sovereign nations under international law, i.e. having external 
sovereignty, their characteristics also suggested they had internal 
sovereignty. The tribes had territory with clearly delineated borders 
within which they asserted exclusive authority to enforce their own 
law. Within this territory they had both the right and practice of self-
government.  In addition, the tribes had agreed to certain codes of 
conduct regarding non-citizens within their territory and demanded 
different treatment for their citizens from the federal government. 
Finally, the tribes had the ultimate sovereign right of war and peace, 
a right recognized to inhere only in international sovereigns. 
In contrast, the colonies as described in Worcester were found 
to have no external or internal sovereignty—ultimate authority and 
title was asserted by the British Crown under the Discovery 
doctrine. This title granted proprietorship to Great Britain and the 
colonies as grantees of the Crown but had no impact on the 
independence of the tribes. Marshall wrote, “these grants asserted a 
title against Europeans only, and were considered a blank paper so 
 
158 Id. at 500-501. 
159 Id. at 501. 
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far as the rights of the natives were concerned.”160 Unlike the tribes, 
the boundaries of the colonies were set by the Crown. Moreover, the 
Crown could modify the rights of individuals within those 
boundaries such as it did by the Royal Proclamation of 1763.161  
Crucially from an international law perspective, the power of 
making offensive and defensive war, the ultimate prerogative of the 
international sovereign was not given the colonies by the Crown.  
“The power of making war is conferred by these charters on the 
colonies, [but] defensive war alone seems to have been 
contemplated.”162   
 
It is the sovereign power alone...which has the right 
to make war...War is either defensive or offensive.  
The purpose of defensive war is simple, namely self-
defense; the purpose of offensive war varies 
according to the different interest of nations, but in 
general it relates to the enforcement of certain rights 
or to their protection.  A sovereign attack a nation, 
either to obtain something which he lays claim or to 
punish the nation for an injury he has received from 
it or to forestall and an injury it which is about to 
inflict upon him.... 163    
 
The inability to wage offensive and defensive war, according to 
international law, would prevent the colonies from acquiring 
dominion and sovereignty over the Indians by right of conquest or 
as grantees of the crown.  All the success of their arms would 
redoubt to the benefit of the British sovereign.164   
Under the Compact Theory and the Doctrine of the Landed 
States, the assertion of independence by the united colonies and the 
states should have changed their previous dependence upon the 
 
160 Id. at 497. 
161 Id. at 496. 
162 Id. at 545 (emphasis in original) (The court found that the Crown conferred 
the power of defensive and offensive was but “only on just cause” on the colony 
of Rhode Island). 
163 See VATTEL, supra  note 33, at 235-36. 
164 See GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 335. “But according to the law of nations, not 
only the person, who makes war upon just grounds; but any one whatsoever, 
engaged in regular and formal war, becomes absolute proprietor of everything 
which he takes from the enemy: so that all nations respect his title, and title of 
all, who derive through him their claim to such possessions.”  
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Crown.  However, the Worcester Court does not understand the 
revolution to have changed the non-sovereign status of each colony.  
According to the Compact Theory, each state became a sovereign 
independent nation within the society of nations at the time they 
declared independence. Instead, the Worcester Court emphasized 
the “sovereign” role of the Confederation Government and 
Continental Congress prior to the 1789 constitution. From this 
perspective, the international affairs aspect of Native American 
relations is crucial evidence of the pre-eminence of the national 
government. The relations of war and peace and international 
relations in general, the Court stated, were recognized by all the 
colonies as residing in the Crown.  As the revolution commenced, 
the colonies sent delegates to the Continental Congress and later to 
the Confederation Congress.  
 
Congress, therefore, was considered as invested with 
all the power of war and peace, and congress 
dissolved our connection with the mother country 
and declared these United Colonies to be 
independent states. Congress employed diplomatic 
agents, negotiated treaties and signed treaties.165   
 
Moreover, “from the same necessity and on the same principles, 
Congress assumed the management of Indian affairs in the name of 
the colonies and later for the Confederation.”  Attempts were made 
to have treaties of peace and trade with the Indians, but “[t]hese not 
proving successful, war was carried on under the direction and with 
the forces of the United states [sic]... The confederation found 
congress in the exercise of the same powers of peace and war, in our 
relations with Indian nations, as with those of Europe.” 166   The 
Articles of Confederation simply adopted this state of affairs: 
That instrument [the Articles of Confederation] 
surrendered the powers of peace and war to 
congress, and prohibited them to the states, 
respectively unless the state be actually 
invaded.....The 1789 Constitution in contrast 
confers “on congress the powers of war and peace; 
 
165 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 500. 
166 Id. at 558. 
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of making treaties, and of regulating 
commerce....167  
The Court emphasized the non-international status of the states 
when it then asserts that neither the colonies nor later the states could 
alter the rights of the tribes because the power of making treaties, 
(and breaking treaties) was transferred directly from the British 
Crown to the federal government.168 Despite the 1776 Declaration 
of Independence or the 1783 Treaty, for the Court, the transfer of 
authority from the Crown to the United States did not include the 
recognition of internal and external sovereignty in each of the states. 
The authority went from the British Crown directly to the federal 
government. 
 
D. Supreme Sovereignty and Tribal Rights in the American System 
 
The collision of national and state governments in the first 
decades of the 19th century created a reticence on the part of the 
Marshall Court regarding the sovereign premonitions of the 
individual states. The Compact Theory, which was the driving 
ideological engine for state authority and the concomitant 
deprecation of federal authority, was an anathema to those with 
nationalistic orientation.169 In the Marshall Indian cases discussed 
above, the Court particularly depreciated the authority and 
international sovereignty of individual states when it discussed the 
relationship between tribes and the federal government. In many 
respects, of course, the Court was commenting on the status of the 
states after the establishment of the 1789 constitution.  However, the 
cases suggest that the Court advocated a more radical position -- that 
the states were never actually sovereign in an international or 
 
167 Id. at 558-599. 
168 “The actual state of things at the time [the founding of the colonies], and all 
history since, explain these charters; and the king of Great Britain, at the treaty 
of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown.  These newly asserted 
titles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated in Indian treaties; 
extending them first, the protection of Great Britain, and afterwards that of the 
United States.” Id. at 560. 
169 Chief Justice Marshall, for example, noted that: “The argument in all its 
forms is essentially the same.  It is founded, not on the words of the constitution, 
but on its spirit, a spirit extracted, not from the words of the instrument, but from 
his view [counsel for Virginia] of the nature of our union and of the great 
fundamental principles on which the fabric stands.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
257, 295 (1821). 
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external sense during and after the revolution, and “states,” they did 
not have capacity to create the federal government. This perspective 
echoed the Court’s position in McCulloch where Marshall argued 
that the states, despite their “international” premonitions, were 
incompetent to form a federal union represented by the federal 
government.  
 
It has been said, that the people already surrender all 
their powers to the State sovereignties and had 
nothing more to give. But, surely, the question 
whether they may resume and modify the powers 
granted to government does not remain settled in this 
country. Much more might the legitimacy of the 
general government be doubted, had it been created 
by the states. The powers delegated to the State 
sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not 
by a distinct and independent sovereignty, created by 
themselves. To the formation of a league, such as was 
the confederation, the state sovereignties were 
certainly competent. But when “in order to form a 
more perfect union,” it was necessary to change this 
alliance into an effective government, possessing 
great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on 
the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, 
and deriving its powers directly from them, was felt 
and acknowledged by all.170  
 
Because all state action was sub-national, the Lockean concepts 
privileging state authority and state claims to Indian lands were also 
discarded. The early cases make clear that only the federal 
government could claim sovereignty to various Indian lands as 
successor in interest to Great Britain where the corresponding state 
claimed (based on Locke) that cultivators were more legitimate than 
hunters and gatherers. 
 
To the United States, it could be a matter of no 
concern, whether their whole territory was devoted 
to hunting grounds, or whether an occasional village, 
 
170 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819) (emphasis added). 
 
 209 
and an occasional corn field interrupted, and gave 
some variety to the scene.171 
 
From this perspective, the national government of the United States, 
from the Continental Congress through the Confederation Congress, 
and the 1789 federal government had always been the pre-eminent 
receptacle of the sovereignty of the American people.   
This depreciation of state authority embedded tribal rights 
within the American legal system as federally guaranteed rights. 
Rhetorically, the Court placed the tribes back into the international 
sphere and used international law to justify the federal government’s 
exclusive authority as a demonstration of its sovereign prerogative 
in the domestic and international arenas. As such, from these early 
cases until the present, American law has recognized that Indian 
tribes retain an international/national character and residual 
sovereignty. This sovereignty provides for, among other things, a 
right of self-government and guarantees them a possessory interest 
in their lands. It also includes a duty of protection and fair dealing 
on the part of the United States.  
These tribal rights were the result of the judicial recognition that 
Indian tribes had a pre-existing sovereignty and independence that 
only could be diminished by federal authority. This federal authority 
remained exclusive and paramount. The tribes, although analogous 
to international states, were not equated with other international 
“state” actors such as Great Britain or the federal government. While 
the recognition that discovery did not annul their pre-existing rights 
arising from the natural right to possession of their lands, it did not 
mean that the Indians were entitled to the same “natural rights” that 
other individuals and societies had to the lands they occupied.  
Instead, it signified that the federal government had the exclusive 
right to determine the status of Indians within the legal system -- not 
that federal government or federal courts needed to recognize those 
rights. The result was an expansion of federal authority under the 
Article I commerce power and the plenary power doctrine.172 Under 
 
171 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 498. 
172 Arguably the Indian commerce clause was not designed to give Congress 
exclusive or plenary power over Indian tribes but was designed to resolve 
conflicts between the federal and state governments over the management of 
commercial and political relationships with the tribes. “The regulation of 
commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations 
in the articles of confederation, which render the provision obscure and 
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this legal discourse, the fact that an Indian tribe has a treaty with the 
federal government did not alter the fact that they are a “conquered” 
people who had  acquired no  rights to their possessions under 
international law despite their previous international status. The 
treaty rights or common law possessory interests could be 
conditioned or subject to statutory diminishment.173 This potential 
for defeasement or the unilateral diminishment of Indian legal 
authority within the constitutional system is inherent in the federal-
tribal relationship. For the Court, as set forth in M’Intosh and 
reiterated in Worcester, all rights and title in the United States rested 
ultimately upon conquest. Conquest, or the act of making war or 
extinguishment of title by purchase, resided exclusively in the 
national government, and with it, the power to alter the status and 
law of conquered peoples. As Native American tribes were held by 
the Court to fall within the status of “conquered peoples” regardless 
of the actual ability of the United States to establish jurisdiction on 
the ground, Federal supremacy and plenary power followed as a 
constitutional corollary. 
 
contradictory.  The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any 
States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its 
own limits.  What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is 
not yet settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in 
Federal Councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a 
State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an 
external authority, without so far intruding on their internal rights of legislation, 
is absolutely incomprehensible. Federalist 42  (Madison), ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1788).  
The basic rules concerning the scope of the power conferred by the commerce 
clause within the borders of the United States were set forth in the case Gibbons 
v. Ogden and Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company. Gibbons noted that 
the right of commerce derived from "those laws whose authority is 
acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world." The Constitution merely 
found the existing right and gave the federal government the power to regulate 
commerce.  States could not hinder free exchange and the right of intercourse 
between state and state." This power to prevent certain acts which burden trade 
(the dormant commerce clause) did not need to be exercised by the federal 
government in order to restrict state action. Blackbird Creek limited the reach of 
the dormant commerce clause where the burdens to commerce were incidental 
state action which improved local welfare and health. Thus the commerce clause 
was intended to remove barriers to trade not confer general powers on the 
Federal government.  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 27; Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh 
Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829). 
173 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591 (1873) (explaining that Indian possessory 
interest allows Indians to use lands for whatever purpose provided it is for 
improvement); The Cherokee Tabacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870) (explaining 
that jurisdiction of United States extends to all territory of United States and 
federal statute supersedes earlier federal treaty). 
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Nevertheless, the preclusion of state authority in American 
Indian jurisprudence has also given rise to legal doctrines that can 
be protective of Indian rights against the federal government. These 
doctrines justify federal power but also include corresponding 
principles legally protective of tribal interests. First, the tribes are 
independent entities that possess inherent sovereignty: 
 
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, "inherent powers 
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." 
Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-
governing sovereign political communities. Like all sovereign 
bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe laws for 
their members and to punish infractions of those laws.174 
 
This sovereignty, while subject to complete extinguishment and 
regulation by Congress, nevertheless remains an independent source 
of authority over tribal members and land. It can also provide a basis 
for the replacement of state regulation with tribal regulation of off-
reservation usufructuary activities. 
Second, the opinions in Cherokee Nation, and more particularly 
in Worcester, held that the tribe had the contractual capacity to 
create legally binding obligations that are enforceable in federal and 
state courts. The 1789 Constitution made treaties self-executing, but 
the issue of contractual capacity had not been addressed. The British 
Crown and other European governments had entered into treaties of 
cession that recognized the sovereign authority of the aboriginal 
chiefs, but attitudes were changing – even as the federal government 
implemented a policy of conciliation, treaty making, and civilization 
towards the tribes. Anger over indigenous hostility and violence 
directed at settlers; frustration over the rejection of Christianity and 
“civilization”; the idea of Manifest Destiny; as well as the growing 
acceptance of “scientific” theories which posited that related race to 
lower intellectual prowess and cultural development, led many 
Americans to conclude that Native Americans were inferior and 
borne to servitude.175  
 
174 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978) (citations omitted). 
175 As stated by historian Alden Vaughan: “A certain type of cultural relativity 
and moral absolutism combined…to show that though white and red man were 
of the same biological mould, the Indian possessed customs that fitted him 
perfectly to his level of development in the history of man, but the level was far 
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These attitudes spilled over into the legal system. “Where is the 
rule to stop?” asked Justice Johnson as he argued against the notion 
that the Cherokee constituted a state in Cherokee Nation: “Must 
every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or 
nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on 
exclusively, be recognized as a state?” 176  Nevertheless, the 
Worcester majority simply held that the contractual capacity related 
to self-government, the status of the other contracting party, and the 
use of a treaty was a political decision of the federal government.177 
This act of recognition itself was arguably an act only an 
international sovereign could make.178    
Third, treaty making process is circumscribed by the Reserved 
Rights Doctrine. The existence and continued traction of the 
Reserved Rights doctrine with its corresponding reservation of 
usufructuary hunting, fishing, and gathering rights owes its 
existence to judicial recognition of the tribe’s diminished 
sovereignty and independent character. On one hand, the doctrine 
can be understood in contract terms: as an application of rule 
construing an agreement against the drafter, as a recognition that 
contracts involving land must use precise language, and that implied 
terms of a contract must not be contrary to the underlying purposes 
of the agreement. On the other hand, the Reserved Rights doctrine 
is due to recognition that the tribes retain a diminished international 
sovereignty and right of self-government over a particular territory. 
While the national government holds radical title to the territory, the 
fee is united only by cession or a conquest i.e. it is sourced in a grant 
 
inferior to that of the white European. The savage was the zero point of human 
society. ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, ROOTS OF AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE 
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 21-22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995); ROBERT F. 
BERKHOFER, JR., SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROTESTANT 
MISSION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE, 1787-1862  11 (Univ. of Ky., 
1977). 
176 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 25. 
177 In his Worcester concurrence, Justice M’Lean was explicit that self-
government, not sovereignty, was crucial to contractual capacity. It is said that 
these treaties are nothing more than compacts, which cannot be considered as 
obligatory on the United States, from a want of power in the Indians to enter into 
them. He writes “ What is a treaty? The answer is, it is a compact formed 
between two nations or communities, having the right of self -government.  Is it 
essential that each party shall possess the same attributes of sovereignty, to give 
force to the treaty? This will not be pretended: for, on this ground, very few 
valid treaties could be formed. The only requisite is, that each of the contracting 
parties shall possess the right of self -government, and the power to perform the 
stipulations of the treaty.” Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581. 
178 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 271 (1808). 
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of pre-existing allodial rights from a previously subsisting legal 
entity. Indeed, courts have continuously recognized and applied the 
idea that treaties with Indians are analogous to international treaties. 
“[T]he powers to make treaties with the Indian tribes is,” the Court 
stated in United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 
“…coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign nations.” 179 
Under international law rules of treaty interpretation, the 
relinquishment of these pre-existing rights, either self-government 
or implied rights which enable the continued existence of the 
contracting party, such as hunting rights, is preserved by treaty 
unless explicitly extinguished.180  
 
179 United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876). 
The foreign nature of the individual Indians and the tribes was contrasted with 
that of slaves in the infamous Dred Scott case by Chief Justice Taney. Taney 
wrote “The situation of this [the slave] population was altogether unlike that of 
the Indian race.  The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial 
communities, and never amalgamated with them in social connections or in 
government.  But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and 
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by 
their own laws.  Many of these political communities were situated in territories 
to which the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion.  But that claim 
was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long 
as they thought proper, and neither the English nor colonial Governments 
claimed or exercised any dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was 
occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of the territory, until the tribe 
or nation consented to cede it.  These Indian Governments were regarded and 
treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the red 
man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from 
the time of the first emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the 
different Governments which succeeded each other.  Treaties have been 
negotiated with them, and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who 
compose these Indian political communities have always been treated as 
foreigners not living under our Government. It is true that the course of events 
has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States under 
subjection to the white race; and it has been found necessary, for their sake as 
well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupillage, and to legislate to a 
certain extent over them and the territory they occupy.  But they may, without 
doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the 
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; 
and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode 
among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges 
which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.” Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-404 (1857). 
180 Vattel, supra note 33, at 3-4. I do not mean to argue that international law 
rules control the federal, state and tribe relationship or that there has be a direct 
incorporation of international law rules of treaty interpretation into American 
Indian law. This would ignore the Discovery Doctrine which presumes that 
international law rules do not apply. I simply note that international rules 
regarding consent and the scope of agreement between sovereigns and the 
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Related to Reserved Rights doctrine is the recognition of residual 
sovereignty, which provides a mechanism for the exercise of tribal 
law and authority over areas outside the territorial boundaries of the 
reservation. Within the context of the state-federal disputes, 
sovereignty was considered co-extensive with territory, but tribal 
sovereignty was articulated as sovereignty over its members. The 
state may hold sovereignty and authority over the territory within 
borders, but tribal sovereignty, or control and jurisdiction over tribal 
members, remained in the tribe, guaranteed by and subject to federal 
authority. Absent federal action to diminish this sovereignty, the 
right to regulate tribal membership remains both an inherent right 
and a federally guaranteed right. This right of regulation over 
members has been an important aspect in the exercise of off-
reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. In many 
circumstances’ tribal regulation of members outside of the 
reservation can supersede to state regulation. 
Fourth, American Law has incorporated a more extensive and 
legally enforceable notion of federal fiduciary obligation towards 
the tribes than those recognized in other common law settler states 
such as Canada and New Zealand. The anomalous position of tribes 
arising from their prior occupation, possession and defense of 
territory in North America coupled with the inapplicability of 
Anglo-American legal and constitutional categories, has given rise 
to federal fiduciary and trust obligations towards the tribes and tribal 
property. These obligations interpose federal authority between the 
tribes and the individual states and provide a legally enforceable 
standard on federal action.181 In addition, this process led to the 
 
interpretation of treaties have influenced the legal interpretation of Indian 
treaties and statutory agreements. 
181 “These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.  They are communities 
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.  
Dependent for their political rights.  They owe no allegiance to the States, and 
receive from them no protection.  Because of the local ill feeling, the people of 
the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.  From their 
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the 
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, 
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.  This has always been 
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the 
question has arisen.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-844 (1886); 
“Our construction of these statutes and regulations [relating to federal 
management of forests owned by the tribe or allottees within the reservation] is 
reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between 
the United States and the Indian people. This Court has previously emphasized 
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development of the protective canons of treaty interpretation. 182  In 
the legal analysis relating to the substance of treaty negotiations the 
doctrine and canons create a presumption that the United States 
would not use its superior power and knowledge to the detriment of 
the tribes and interprets treaty language in a manner more solicitous 
of tribal perspectives. 
More significantly this reasoning led to the Court to hold that 
treaties were legal obligations rather than simply non-enforceable 
political commitments of Congress and the Executive. The federal 
government had inherited this duty of protection from the British 
Crown and it remained a primary justification for federal resistance 
to state assertions of jurisdiction over the tribes. Nevertheless, where 
the Indians gained some traction in treaty law, the fiduciary 
relationship and the political nature of the tribal-federal relationship 
been also used to diminish tribal authority. In the late 19th century, 
as might expected by the discussion above, the fiduciary relationship 
was used as justification for the exercise of plenary federal power 
over the tribes and the increased use of the Political Question 
doctrine to dispense with treaty protections.183   
 
“the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its 
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.” United States 
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (citing Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 
F.2d 981 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). 
182 “[T]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the 
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.” Two such 
canons are directly applicable in this case: first, the States may tax Indians only 
when Congress has manifested clearly its consent to such taxation second, 
statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous 
provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Montana. v. Blackfeet, 471 U.S. 759, 
766 (1985) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 
1985); Choatte v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). “In construing any treaty between 
the United States and an  Indian tribe, it must always…be borne in mind that the 
negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an 
enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, 
masters of a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating 
the various technical estates known to their law, and assisted by their own 
language; that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, 
who have no written language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of 
legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is 
framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United 
States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the 
technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they 
would naturally be understood by the Indians.” Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-
11 (1899) (citation omitted). 
183 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384. The political question doctrine was most forcefully 
articulated in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, which presumes that Congressional 
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Finally, the federal government has plenary and exclusive 
authority over Indian tribes.184  In United States v. Kagama, the 
Court following the logic of the Marshall trilogy, stated that 
Congress had complete power as a trustee over the tribes and it had 
the complete authority and power to determine when tribal self-
government would end. The Court held this authority not to be one 
of the enumerated powers in the constitution but held it was the 
result of the federal governments “course of dealing” with the tribes 
from which had risen a “duty of protection and with it the power.”185 
 
actions with regard to Indians are not subject to review by the courts. Lone Wolf, 
187 U.S. at 566; It was never fully accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court even at 
the time it was articulated. In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 
the Court noted that government authority over tribal property, although plenary 
may be challenged when the governmental action infringes on constitutional 
rights because Indian rights are rooted within the constitution. Delaware Tribal 
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
184 “The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority 
over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 
764 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3). 
185 The major sources of federal authority over the tribes are the commerce 
clause, the treaty power, the property clause and the trust relationship that the 
federal government owes the tribes due to their dependent status.  Art. I, § 8, cl. 
3. of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the power “To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes….” As the federal government ceased signing treaties 
with the tribes in 1871 this clause has become a more important source of 
federal authority. The treaty power and the supremacy clause found in Art. IV 
“[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws 
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”; incorporate federal foreign affairs 
power and international law principles into the federal-tribe relationship. The 
trust relationship is premised on the dependent status of the tribes and is a 
structural aspect of the tribal-state-federal relationship. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court noted in United States v. Kagama: “These Indian tribes are the wards of 
the nation.  They are communities dependent on the United States--dependent 
largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights.  They owe no 
allegiance to the States and receive from them no protection.  Because of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their 
deadliest enemies.  From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to 
the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in 
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the 
power.  This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and 
by this court, whenever the question has arisen.” Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-344; 
The courts have also found that the federal government has authority over the 
tribes and the states derived from its fee ownership of Indian lands. U.S. CONST. 
art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2 states in part that: “The Congress shall have power to 
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States….”; In United States v. Winans, 
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As such, the power to regulate Indian tribes is completely federal. 
This regulatory authority enables the federal government to legally 
disregard treaty rights as well as terminate legal recognition of tribal 
entities if it so chooses.186 States are excluded from extending their 
jurisdiction and regulation to Indian tribes and land unless 
specifically authorized by Congress. This is so even in those areas 
constitutionally deemed to be important aspects of state sovereignty 
such as control over natural resources.187 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that the federal state conflict which 
occurred prior to the American Civil War informed the judicial 
decision-making in early Indian jurisprudence and these 
institutional disputes have had a significant impact on the existence 
and scope of Native American Law in the United States.  
It is clear that the Marshall Court did not agree that the federal 
government and the States were co-equal sovereigns nor was their 
 
Justice McKinna quoted: “By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United 
States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the only 
Government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire dominion and 
sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and State, over all the Territories, 
so long as they remain in a territorial condition.” United States v. Winans, 198 
U.S. 371, 383-384 (1905) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 (1893)); 
“The extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land for settlement and 
preparing the way for future States, were appropriate to the objects for which the 
United States held the Territory. And surely it was within the competency of the 
Nation to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed 
as "taking fish at all usual and accustomed places." Nor does it restrain the State 
unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right.  It only fixes in the land 
such easements as enables the right to be exercised.” Winans, 198 U.S. at 383-
384; See also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, 
Scope and Limitations, 132 UNIV. of PA. L. REV.195 (1984). 
186 For example, The Menominee Termination Act established a mechanism to 
“to provide for orderly termination of Federal supervision over the property and 
members” of the tribe. Under its provisions, the tribe was to formulate a plan for 
future control of tribal property and service functions theretofore conducted by 
the United States. Once approved the tribe’s relationship with the federal 
government would be severed and its property and members would become 
subject to the law of the state within which their reservation was located.  Local 
governance structures in the state would be extended into the former reservation. 
The Menominee Termination Act, 68 Stat. 250 (1954). 
187 For example, Justice O’Connor writing for the majority, stated in Mille Lacs 
v. Minnesota; “Although States have important interests in regulating wildlife 
and natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the 
Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its 
enumerated constitutional powers, such as treaty making.” Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999). 
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relative authority and power in the federal system reciprocal. The 
federal government penetrated the states, but a state could not 
assert their jurisdiction in areas of federal authority -- particularly 
in those areas that involved fundamental issues of sovereignty like 
“war and peace,” “treaties,” and “title to and jurisdiction over 
territory.” In this sense, the federal government is (and was) 
“more” sovereign.  It has both internal and external sovereignty. It 
existed on both the domestic and international plane.  It claimed 
jurisdiction over the entire area and population of the United States 
as the Lockean civil society.  Each state, on the other hand, while 
“sovereign,” was analogous to a tribe in that it held a “diminished 
sovereignty” within the federal system.  Unlike a tribe, however, 
its residual sovereign powers had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the fundamental legal issues of war and peace. Indeed, with the 
Union victory in American Civil War, the logic of absolute federal 
authority as set forth in Kagama became manifest. Ironically, the 
legal basis of the continued or renewed exercise of treaty rights has 
been bound up in the same determination of paramount and 
exclusive federal authority.  These rights include the legally 
enforceable nature of Indian treaties, Reserved Rights doctrine, the 
fiduciary duty toward the tribes, and the protective canons of treaty 
interpretation. 
The Marshall Court, by analogizing tribes to foreign states and 
recognizing their independence and self-government as collective 
entities, provided a framework through which the tribes were 
incorporated into the federal system. Yet despite these positive 
rights, the vindication of federal authority resulted in the legal 
determination that the federal government holds exclusive and 
absolute power over the tribes. This power is not the power and 
authority as understood in liberal theory and falls short of genuine 
federal relationship subsisting between the federal government and 
the tribes. Tribal collectivities are not constitutive of the national 
state; they are excluded from the Lockean contract by which state 
authority is legitimated in American political theory. Rather, they 
are “subjects,” analogous to conquered people in law in that their 
legal entitlements and rights are essentially non-protected and 
subject to defeasement at the will of the sovereign national 
American state.  While the constitution explicitly recognized the 
existence of Indians and Indian tribes, accommodations for their 
“dependent” status and natural rights, using accepted categories of 
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international law and natural law, were available. This is not to say 
that racial intolerance, bigotry, and greed did not also diminish the 
fortunes of the tribes in their quest to protect their lands and right 
to self-government.188 The white European settlers and citizens of 
the United States may have simply been unwilling to recognize any 
legal or political protections for the Indians, regardless of the 
fulminations of legal scholars and courts.  
 
188 The Constitution mentions Indians and Tribes two times. In both in the 
Indian Commerce Clause; “foreign nations, states and Indian tribes” and in the 
so-called "Indians not taxed" clause. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. I, § 2. Indians were 
considered members to be members of their respective tribes rather than citizens 
or property (as in the case of African American slaves under Dred Scott). 
